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This research analyzes operational and programmatic data from all Air National 
Guard and 13 of 14 active duty F-16C/D Fighter Wings (FW) from 1998 to 2004 in 
search of explanatory variables that influence a wing’s Cost Per Flying Hour (CPFH).  
Using data from both the Air Force Total Ownership Cost database and from the Air 
Force Knowledge Systems database, this research evaluates the predictive ability of the 
following nine explanatory variables: aircraft age, average sortie duration, MajCOM, 
base location, utilization rate, percent engine type, percent block, percent deployed, and 
previous year’s CPFH, the last four of which were previously untested.  Additionally, this 
research builds regression models that accurately predict the CPFH of an F-16C/D FW 
using these operational and programmatic variables.  This research concludes that the 
following variables are highly predictive and quantifies the relative influence of each of 
these variables:  utilization rate, base location, percent block, percent engine type, 
average age of aircraft, and the previous year’s CPFH.  Finally, this research identifies a 
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PREDICTING THE COST PER FLYING HOUR FOR THE F-16 USING 




Many military leaders and budget analysts believe that increases in the costs of 
operating and maintaining aging aircraft have created a budgetary crisis in the United 
States Air Force.  The phrase “Death Spiral” has been coined to describe the phenomenon 
where funding is taken away from modernization programs in order to finance rapidly 
increasing operations and maintenance (O&M) expenses, which, in turn, take funding 
away from modernization programs.  In the 2001 Air Force Posture Statement, Air Force 
Secretary James Roche stated, “Over the past five years, our flying hours have remained 
relatively constant, but the cost of executing our flying hour program has risen over 45% 
after inflation.  Older aircraft are simply more difficult to maintain as mechanical failures 
become less predictable, repairs become more complicated, and parts become harder to 
come by and more expensive” (Roche, 2001).  Furthermore, Defense Deputy Secretary 
Paul Wolfowitz echoed the Secretary’s sentiments when he told reporters in Aug 2001, 
“Aircraft, tanks, and other equipment are now beginning to become so old that operations 
and maintenance costs for those systems have begun to skyrocket”  (Capaccio, 2001).  
The Air Force, along with the other services, claims that aging equipment is the root 
cause of the ever-increasing O&M costs.   
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), however, has taken issue with this 
claim.  The director of the CBO, Dan Crippen, reported, “CBO’s findings are in conflict 
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with the service’s statements that spending on Operations and Maintenance for 
equipment is growing rapidly” and that the Air Force’s position is “based on selective 
data” (Cappacio, 2001).  The CBO report “finds no evidence to support the services’ 
contention that spending on O&M for aging equipment has driven total O&M spending” 
(CBO paper, 2001).  The report also stated that “the fraction of O&M funds spent 
operating and maintaining equipment appears to be declining” (CBO paper, 2001).   
Steven Kosiak, a defense budget analyst for the non-partisan Center for Strategic and 
Budgetary Assessments believes “focusing attention on the aging equipment issue has let 
the services avoid cutting costs related especially to headquarters, training, 
administration, communications, and base operations, where substantial cost growth has 
occurred over the past decade” (Cappacio, 2001).    
Both sides acknowledge that in the past decade, budget estimates for the Air 
Force Flying Hour program have been inaccurate.  For example, in both 1997 and 1998 
the Air Force had ran out of funding for the Flying Hour program and how to request an 
additional $300M from Congress to make it through each fiscal year (GAO, 1999).   
What is missing in this discussion is the identification of factors that caused O&M costs 
to fluctuate.  This research quantifies the influence operational and programmatic factors 
have on one facet of O&M costs, the Cost Per Flying Hour (CPFH), for the F-16C/D.  
This knowledge is then used to build a model that predicts the CPFH for any fighter wing 





O&M costs are a broad category that covers everything from health care to 
communications.  The portion concerned with operating and maintaining aircraft is called 
the Flying Hour program.  The Air Force Cost Analysis Improvement Group (AFCAIG) 
develops CPFH factors for each aircraft type, also known as Mission Design Series 
(MDS), and for each Major Command (MajCOM).  Budgets are prepared by multiplying 
each CPFH factor by the number of hours the MajCOM is authorized to fly (GAO, 1999).  
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Figure 1:  FY 04 O&M Budget 
 
The CPFH is composed of three commodity groups: Consumable Supplies, 





Also known as General Support Division, this commodity consists of aircraft 
parts or supplies that are not economical to repair or have repair procedure and are 
discarded after use (Rose, 1997).  These items are centrally procured by the Air Force 
through the Defense Logistics Agency.  Examples of this type of commodity include 
screws, washers, wiring, and lights (Rose, 1997).  Additionally, this commodity also 
includes purchases from the government purchase card.  These purchases include other 
necessary items such as aircraft tools.  Requirements for this commodity are determined 
by MajCOMs.  In 2004, expenditures in this commodity accounted for 11% of the total 
$6.1B Air Force Flying Hour program (AFCAA Presentation, 2004). 
Aviation Fuel (AVFUEL) 
This commodity refers to the fuel expended during flight (Rose, 1997).  
Requirements for AVFUEL are also determined by MajCOMs.  In 2004, expenditures for 
this commodity accounted for 24% of the total Air Force Flying Hour program. 
Depot Level Repairables (DLRs) 
Also known as the Material Support Division, this commodity refers to aircraft 
parts that when broken are removed and repaired (Rose, 1997).  The Spares Requirement 
Review Board (SRRB) develops the requirements for these items.  In Chapter 2, this 
process is more thoroughly discussed.  In 2004, expenditures for the DLR commodity 
accounted for 65% of the total Air Force Flying Hour program (AFCAA Presentation, 
2004).   
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Motivating the Problem 
The Flying Hour program is a highly visibly portion of the President’s budget that 
has historically been prone to inaccurate estimates.  As noted earlier, inaccurate budget 
estimates require the Air Force to ask Congress for additional funding.  Congress, then, 
typically takes funding away from modernization programs in order to ensure the 
solvency of the Flying Hour program.  Since fuel costs and consumable supplies compose 
a small percentage of the total budget and are much more stable and predictable then 
DLRs, this research investigated variables that influenced the annual expenditures for 
DLRs only (GAO, 1999).   
Research Questions 
1. Does the CPFH of an F-16 fighter wing increase in a linearly fashion with 
increasing age of aircraft? 
2. Does the CPFH of an F-16 fighter wing significantly change during 
contingencies? 
3. Is the CPFH of an F-16 fighter wing dependent on the previous year’s CPFH? 
4. Does the Average Sortie Duration (ASD) of an F-16 fighter wing influence that 
wing’s CPFH? 
5. Does the utilization rate of an F-16 fighter wing influence that wing’s CPFH? 
6. Does the percent engine type of an F-16 fighter wing influence that wing’s 
CPFH? 
7. Do different aircraft blocks have a statistically significant influence on the CPFH 
for an F-16 fighter wing? 
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8. Does the MajCOMs influence the CPFH for F-16 fighter wings? 
9. Does base location influence the CPFH of F-16 fighter wings? 
10. What is the relative influence of each of these operational and programmatic 
variables? 
Scope and Key Assumption 
This research combines data from the Air Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) 
database and the Air Force Knowledge System (AFKS) database into a single relational 
database spanning 1998 to 2004.  This database contains operational, economic, and 
programmatic data for all F-16C/D’s assigned to 40 fighter wings across five active duty 
MajCOM’s and the Air National Guard (ANG).  Data from 2004 is withheld in order to 
validate the models.  Using hypothesis tests, each research question is answered.  The 
answers from these investigative questions are used to develop a model to predict the 
CPFH for F-16C/D fighter wings.   
 The key assumption of this research is that the block number and engine type of 
each tail number remained the same across this timeframe.  Since neither the AFKS nor 
the AFTOC database contained this specific historic data, it is necessary to make this 
assumption.  Chapter 4 analyzes the validity of this assumption.  
Preview 
The next chapter expands upon the literature that was previously discussed as well 
as other studies relevant to O&M cost estimation.   In Chapter 3, the specific steps taken 
to build the database and the model are outlined.  Since the data comes from two different 
sources, the integrity of the database is verified by comparing a common field, hours.  In 
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Chapter 4, the investigative questions are answered and a model is created to predict the 
CPFH for a F-16C/D fighter wing.  Also, analysis on the key assumptions is performed.  




II. Literature Review 
 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter is separated into two sections.  The first section provides an 
overview of the financial processes by which the Air Force develops O&M budgets.  In 
particular, this section describes how the Air Force develops CPFH factors.  The second 
section reviews related research regarding variables that influence O&M costs.  This 
latter section begins with research on the effect of aircraft aging and price instability on 
O&M costs and then summarizes research that explored the effect of other variables on 
O&M costs.  It then ends with a presentation of the Logistics Management Institute’s 
new physics based model which included operational variables such as time on the 
ground, number of landings, and numbers of sorties. 
Financial Processes Overview 
Currently, the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System requires the 
operating commands to develop budgets for both fixed and variable expenditures to cover 
the costs of AFMC support services (Keating, 2002).   The variable component is 
expressed as a CPFH.  Once the CPFH factors are developed, they are used to fund 
programs in the Program Objective Memorandum, Budget Estimate Submission, and the 
President’s Budget, as well as the initial distribution to the MajCOMs (Rose, 1997).  
Each MajCOM multiplies the approved command-specific factor for each weapon system 
by the number of programmed flying hours to price each year’s flying hour program.    
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Factor Development Process 
The CPFH factor development process is unique for each specific commodity 
being estimated.  For example, consumable supplies are developed using historical 
obligations and actual flying hours over the previous eight quarters.  They are adjusted to 
remove non-recurring costs in the baseline period and for known future changes, such as 
time compliance technical orders, phase inspections, modifications, and changes in 
operations tempo (OPTEMPO).  The AVFUEL commodity uses historical gallons of fuel 
consumed and actual flying hours flown over a five year moving average.   Fuel is 
adjusted as well to account for reporting errors, anomalies and future OPTEMPO changes 
(Lies, 2005).  The third commodity group, DLRs, is controlled by SRRB and is discussed 
next. 
Spares Requirement Process 
In the past, the spares requirement forecasting process was inefficient (Newsome, 
2002).  There was no central coordination between consummation estimates, spares 
pipeline requirements and readiness spares packages (RSP).  Since the flying-hour factor 
did not cover non-sales based items (e.g. spares pipeline requirements, safety stock, and 
RSPs), they were not included in the MajCOM program objective memorandum 
submissions.  This often resulted in unplanned year-of-execution bills to the Air Force 
(Newsome, 2002).  To address this specific issue, along with a host of other financial 
management issues, the Air Force started the Spares Campaign in December of 2001.   
One of the stated goals of the Spares Campaign was to centralize the spares requirement 
process.  This was accomplished by the creation of the SRRB.  This board is solely 
9 
 
responsible for forecasting spares requirements.  Once developed, the fly spares portion 
of the SRRB is presented to the CPFH AFCAIG for review and approval of proposed fly 
spares CPFH factors and requirements (Lies, 2005). 
Under this current system, “the SRRB computes spares requirement based upon 
the best analytical data available and consensus of relevant parties” (Newsome, 2002).  
The purpose of the SRRB is to integrate the supply chain, historical data, and relevant 
parties into one process that culminates in budget submission representing both 
MajCOMs and AFMC.   
The Impact of Aircraft Age of O&M Costs  
As aircraft age, many different processes take place that influence O&M costs.  
The Congressional Budget Office in their August 2001 report to Congress titled, “The 
Effects of Aging on the Costs of Operating and Maintaining Military Equipment”, listed 
three main factors: Corrosion, Fatigue, and Obsolete Parts. 
 Corrosion:  Corrosion is defined as the “gradual destruction of a metal or alloy by 
a chemical action.”  It is difficult to predict since it is heavily dependent upon the 
environment in which the aircraft is being operated.  The Air Force Corrosion Prevention 
and Control Office (AFCPCO), addresses this specific issue.  According to Major Dan 
Bullock, Chief of AFCPCO, "Up to 50% of the workload on some aircraft at Air Force 
depots is corrosion-related" (AFCPCO website, 2004).  The workload Major Bullock is 




 Fatigue:  If one takes a paper clip and bends it in half, it probably will not break.  
But, if one bends it in half thirty to fifty times, it probably will break.  With each bend, 
small cracks form in the paperclip and given enough replications, the small cracks reach 
what engineers call the “critical crack length”.  At this point, the crack propagates 
throughout the structure.  With each takeoff and landing, aircraft structural components 
are likewise stressed.  “Fatigue refers to the weakening of material that results from 
prolonged stress” (CBO, 2001).  As aircraft near the end of their useful life, the rate of 
fatigue failures increases dramatically.     
 Obsolete parts:  “Many aging systems are expensive to maintain because the 
original manufacturer no longer makes the required parts” (CBO, 2001).  As the life-span 
of aircraft is extended, the original supplier of the part has either gone out of business or 
they are no longer producing the part.  This results in longer procurement times and 
increased costs (CBO, 2001). 
 Mr. Thomas Lies, chief of the Cost Factors Branch at Air Force Cost Analysis 
Agency, brought to my attention during a phone conversation another effect of age on 
spare parts.  He calls it “reliability degradation”.  As parts from aircraft fail and are 
repaired by either base maintenance personnel or by the depots, they are then reinserted 
into supply system.  As time passes, these parts presumably fail at greater rates since the 
parts continue to age.  The effects of fatigue and corrosion degrade individual parts as 
well as whole aircrafts (Lies, 2005).   
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The Relationship between Aircraft Age and Cost 
The Congressional Budget Office’s report presented seven additional studies that 
quantified the relationship between equipment age and O&M cost.  These studies address 
all Department of Defense (DoD) equipment, not just Air Force aircraft.  They are all 
significant in that they used empirical data to quantify this relationship.  The reports are 
categorized in the manner in which the authors collected the data. 
Studies Based on Data for Individual Aircraft  
This first category captured the number of maintenance actions or costs associated 
with individual aircraft that are similar as possible to one another except for their age.  
This method of data collection should produce results that best isolate the effect of age on 
costs.  Since data collection for this type of study can be difficult, there are only a small 
number of such studies.  The results of these studies can be found in Table 1.  Of 
particular importance is the result that all of these studies demonstrate that there is a 
positive relationship between aircraft age and O&M costs.  Also take note of the results 




Table 1:  Studies Based on Data for Individual Aircraft 
Author/Date Equipment Examined Obervations Estimated Effect of an Additional Year of Age
Center for Naval 
Analyses/March 
1991
Five Navy aircraft (the F-
14, E-2, A-6, P-3, and H-
46) from 1984 to 1989
Multiple observations per 
aircraft type per year based 
on the number of aircraft 
entering depots
Maintenance man-hours increased by 0.8 percent 
to 1.4 percent. Materiel costs increased by 0.9 
percent to 3.4 percent
Naval Air Systems 
Command/August 
1993 
Five Navy aircraft (the F-
14, F/A-18, E-2, CH-53, 
and C-2) from 1977 to 
1992
15 observations for the F-14, 
E-2, C-2; 10 observations for 
the F/A-18, CH-53
Depot maintenance manhours per flight hour 
increased by 2 percent to 8 percent. Rate of 
failures increased by 1 percent to 7 percent
Center for Naval 
Analyses/March 
2000 
(a) All F/A-18 aircraft by 
month from 1990 to 
1999
(a) 27,000 observations (a) Maintenance manhours increased by 6.5 percent to 8.9 percent
(b) All F/A-18C aircraft 
by individual sortie for 
June 1996
(b) 3,595 observations (b) Probability of unscheduled maintenance increased by 0.8 percent
Source: Congressional Budget Office
 
 
Studies Based on Average Ages and Aircraft Types over Time 
This category of studies used aggregated data on the average age of a particular 
type of aircraft in a year and investigated the effect of average age on maintenance costs.  
Their results are similar to the results of the first group of study except that their 
estimates are less precise.  This is due to the fact that the reports only have around 10 
data points per aircraft type.  Additionally, they did not account for other variables that 
may have contributed to the rise in maintenance cost.  During the ten years that the data 
was collected, other factors such as changes in maintenance policy or changes in 
operating accounting practices may have confounded their results.   Knowing these 
shortcomings allows the consumer to put the results in proper perspective.  These studies 
are still important because they quantify the impact of age on O&M costs, but they do not 
produce results as clean as studies that use individual aircraft for analysis (CBO, 2001).  
A description of the study along with the results is summarized in Table 2.   
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Table 2:  Studies Based on Average Ages and Aircraft Types Over Time 
Author/Date Equipment Examined Obervations Estimated Effect of an Additional Year of Age
Naval Air Systems 
Command/July 1993
10 Navy aircraft (P-3, S-3, 
CH-53, H-60, H-3, H-46, E-2, 
A-6, F-14, and F/A-18) from 
1982 to 1992
A maximum of 10 observations 
per aircraft.
Maintenance man-hours increased by 2 percent to 6 
percent.  Aircraft overhaul costs ranged from -2 percent 
to 10 percent.  DLR and engine overhaul costs 




The KC-135 and commercial 
727, 737, DC-9, and DC-10 
aircraft
Not available Programmed depot costs increased by 7 percent
Air Force Cost 
Analysis Agency/ 
March 1999
Air Force aircraft grouped by 
type (bomber, cargo/tanker, 
and fighter) using data from 
1986 to 1996
11 observations per type of 
aircraft
Aircraft overhaul costs increased by 2.7 percent to 6.7 
percent
Source: Congressional Budget Office
 
  
 Similar to the previous set of studies, these studies show a positive correlation 
between aircraft age and O&M costs.  Also take note that the ranges of the estimated 
effects are larger then that of the previous study.  For examples, the first study observed 
that the aircraft overhaul cost ranged from -2 to 10 percent.  This is a consequence of the 
small sample size. 
Studies Based on Pooled Average Ages and Aircraft Types over Time 
This category of studies combines, or pools, both different years and different 
types of aircraft before analyzing the effect of average age on cost.  This approach 
increases the number of observations and enabled the researcher to quantify the effect of 
the equipment’s age to be distinguished from other variables.  The downside to this 
methodology is that it assumes each type of aircraft has the same age-related costs.  For 
example, if technological advances made newer aircraft less maintenance intensive, then 
the studies using pooled data might overstate the effects of age on costs.  This does not 
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invalidate the results, but the consumer of this information should be aware of this short-
coming. 
Table 3:  Studies Based on Pooled Averages Ages and Aircraft Types Over Time 




Up to 74 types and versions 
of Air Force aircraft from 
1981 to 1986
400 observations
Operation and support costs (O&M costs plus the costs 
of military personnel) increased by 1.7 percent, and 





(a) 17 Air Force fighter, 
attack, bomber, cargo, and 
helicopter aircraft
(a) 68 observations (a) O&S and O&M costs increased by 1 percent
from 1996 to 1999
(b) 13 Navy fighter, attack, 
cargo, and helicopter 
aircraft from 1986 to 1999
(b) 164 observations (b) O&S costs increased by 2.4 percent, and O&M costs increased by 2.6 percent
c) 20 Navy and Air Force 
fighter, attack, and bomber 
aircraft from 1976 to 1999
c) 327 observations (c) O&M costs increased by 2.5 percent
Source: Congressional Budget Office
 
 
Aging Effect Summary 
Empirical results suggest that each year O&M costs rise between 1.7 and 2.5 
percent.  This cost growth is presumably caused by fatigue, corrosion, and obsolete parts.  
Knowing this, this research models the aging effect by testing whether the previous 
CPFH is linearly related to the current year’s CPFH and by testing whether the average 
age of aircraft is predictive of a fighter wing’s CPFH.  Chapter 4 details this analysis.  
Also noteworthy is the result that depot-level maintenance typically increased between 2 
and 8 percent per year.  The fact that depot-level maintenance is substantially more 
impacted by aging agrees with intuition since most depot-level repairs are caused by 
fatigue and corrosion.  Now that the effect of age on O&M cost has been discussed, we 
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shift to examining the impact of other variables on O&M costs starting with price 
instability.  
Price Instability 
 Changes in prices in aircraft parts have contributed significantly to the variation 
of O&M costs.  The General Accounting Office 1999 report titled, “Observations on the 
Air Force Flying Hour Program” stated, “Price instability has led to obligations 
exceeding funds provided for the flying hour program” (Gebicke, 1999).  As example of 
the magnitude of these changes, Table 4 depicts FY 1999 price changes for specific 
repairable parts (Gebicke, 1999). 
 
Table 4:  Examples of Price Changes 
 
Examples of the Magnitude of Fiscal Year 1999 Price Changes
Repairable 
part Price in Sept 1998
Price in Oct 1998      
(new fiscal year price)
Price 
Change




Core module $1,557,348 $1,709,633 10 $1,592,204 2.24
Core module 380,493 671,099 76 625,003 64.26
Fan module 91,731 219,221 139 204,163 122.57
HPT module 87,109 148,031 70 137,863 58.26
Fan drive 58,339 155,164 166 144,507 147.7
Exciter 3,725,818 1,686 -99.95 1,433 -99.96
Comp rotor 55,694 152,593 173.98 14,660 -73.68
Fan rotor 15,096 105,730 600.38 131,726 772.59
Turbine rotor 52,695 96,913 83.91 10,018 -80.99  
 
 
This extraordinary variation in the price of spare parts can be attributed to 
inefficiencies in the Air Force supply management activity group, the Air Force’s 
primary purchaser of weapon system parts (Gebicke, 1999).  The Air Force supply 
management activity group is part of the Air Force Working Capital Fund.  This 
revolving fund relies on sales to fund future purchases rather than direct congressional 
appropriations.   According to a June 1998 GAO report, titled, “Air Force Supply 
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Management:  Analysis of activity’s group financial report, prices, and cash 
management”, the GAO report concludes that the activity group lacks the ability “to 
produce reliable information on its cost of goods sold and net operating results” (Brock, 
1998).  This has directly contributed to the activity group not generating enough cash and 
requiring the next year’s prices to dramatically change.  A different GAO report, titled, 
“Observations on the Air Force Flying Hour Program” cites this price instability as the 
culprit for the $300M budget shortfall during 1997 and 1998 (Brock, 1999).   
On behalf of the Air Force Studies and Analysis (AFSAA), Mr. Clifton Nees 
contributed to the discussion on the impact of price instability in a briefing he presented 
to Air Force senior leaders in May 2002.  He characterized the variability of DLR 
expenditures for F-16’s by National Stock Number (NSN) across three different fiscal 
years, 1998, 1999, and 2000.   He defined expenditures as the cost of a part times the 
number of parts consumed.  Using transactional data from the AFTOC database, he 
computed the total expenditure change for each individual part across this timeframe.  
Figure 2 displays a histogram of his results and Figure 3 magnifies on the central portion 
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Figure 3:  Change in Expenditure by Part (Magnified) 
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 From Figures 2 and 3, Mr. Nees concluded that the vast majority of parts did not 
see any changes in expenditure from year to year.  In fact, over 95% of the expenditures 
for a given DLR over these years went up or down less than 0.029 percent.  Mr. Nees 
also noted that there were some substantial outliers.  Presumably, the parts listed in the 
GAO report in Table 4 belong to this group of extreme outliers.  He then investigated 
whether those outliers drove the overall change in expenditures for the F-16.  His results 





















































Figure 4:  Outlier Impact on Variation in Expenditures 
 
 Mr. Nees concluded that less than 5% of the parts were driving almost all of the 
variation in expenditure.  This can be seen by observing how small the three middle bars 
are relative to the outliers.  He then asked the question, “Are the 5% of DLRs driving the 
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Figure 5:  Consistency of Outliers 
 
The left column displays the number of positive, 327, and the number of negative, 
193, outliers sample points from the expenditure change from FY 1998 to FY 1999.  
Since this column displays only those sample points using expenditure change year 1998-
1999, each point represents a distinct DLR item.   
The middle column displays the number of positive, 265, and the number of 
negative, 231, outliers sample points.  The right diagonal section of the column displays 
those DLR items which were also positive outliers in 1998-1999, hence the designation 
“2 consecutive increases”.  The 169 DLR items shown in the solid bar represent positive 
outliers for the first time in 1999-2000, hence the designation “All other increases”.  An 
analogous breakdown was performed for the negative outliers. 
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And finally, the right column displays the number of positive, 308, and the 
number of negative, 245, outliers sample points.  The left diagonal section of the column 
displays those DLR items which were also positive outliers in 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 
hence the designation “3 consecutive increases”.  The right diagonal section of the 
column displays those DLR items which were also positive outliers in 1999-2000 hence 
the designation “2 consecutive increases”.  The solid section displays those DLR items 
which were positive outliers for the first time in 2000-2001, hence the designation “All 
other increases”.   An analogous breakdown was performed for the negative outliers. 
As you can see, each year a significant number of new DLR items are identified 
as expenditure change outliers.  That is, the set of DLR items that experience large 
expenditure changes from year to year was not consistent between the years 1998 and 
2001 (Nees, 2002). 
Other Variables that Influence O&M Costs 
Most of the research on this topic has focused on the effect of age on O&M costs.   
Recently, there have been several key studies completed by Logistic Management 
Institute and the RAND corporation that analyzed the effect of other variables besides 
age and price instability on O&M costs.  Some of the variables in their analysis include: 
Mission Profile, Sortie Duration, OPTEMPO, Landings per Sortie, Location, and 
Modifications.  Related research on each variable is provided along with author and year 
of the study.  Included in the list are studies that analyzed responses other than O&M cost 
(e.g. maintenance man-hour or maintenance removals per sortie).  These studies are 




 Mission Profile refers to the objective of the sortie.  During training sorties, it is 
common for pilots to practice high “G” maneuvers.  These sorties place extra stress on 
the aircraft and its components.  Likewise, during recent contingencies, fighter aircraft 
have spent more time patrolling airspace.  This difference is believed to influence O&M 
costs. 
1) The mission profile of F-4 sorties had a direct impact on the number of 
maintenance discrepancies identified by maintainers for certain work unit 
codes (WUC).  Additionally, specific WUC codes are more sensitive to 
certain types of missions then other WUCs.  As an example, the results of the 
fire control system, WUC 74B, for different Mission Symbols are shown in 
Appendix A along with statistical tests (Hunsaker, 1977). 
2) In an unpublished study that was cited in Sherbrook’s literature review, 
Sweetland determined that amount of maintenance performed per sortie was 
significantly higher for training sorties (Donanaldson and Sweetland, 1968). 
3) Using data from 1993 to 1996, Sherbrooke linked data from the supply 
database with the core automated maintenance database and determined short 
training missions where the pilots pull have as many as eight G’s had three 




Average Sortie Duration (ASD) 
1) For the B-52, F-100, F-102, F-4C, and F-5A, unscheduled flight-line man-
hours are only slightly related to sortie length (Donaldson and Sweetland, 
1968). 
2) For the B-52, the percentage of components removed to facilitate other 
maintenance increased with decreasing sortie length (Boeing, 1970). 
3) Sortie length appears to have no effect on maintenance man-hours for the C-5 
(Little, 1972). 
4) The F-4 sortie length had little effect on equipment failure rate per sortie 
(Hunsaker, 1977). 
5) Regardless of sortie length, the C-5 tends to have the same number of 
maintenance write-ups (Casey, 1977). 
6) There is no evidence of a one-to-one relationship between sortie duration and 
spare part demand.  At best, there is only a 7 to 10 percent increase in demand 
for every additional hour of flying for most aircraft (Sherbrooke, 1997). 
7) Contrary to the previous studies, Howell concluded for the C-141A, C-130E, 
and Boeing 727, maintenance removals per sortie depends on sortie length 
(Howell, 1978). 
Utilization rate 
The Air Force defines utilization rate as the number of flight hours per month per 
aircraft.  For the purposes of this research, utilization rate is defined as the number of 
hours per year per aircraft. 
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1) Total B-52 maintenance man-hours per flight hour decreased as utilization 
rates increased while sortie length was held constant (Boeing, 1970). 
2) Higher utilization rates tend to require less maintenance (Sherbrooke, 1997).   
Location 
1) A base-by-base comparison of 3 different pieces of avionics equipment on 
fighter aircraft operating from 9 different bases revealed variations in mean 
time between failures as large as 5 to 1.  On an average basis, there was a 2 to 
1 difference in reported failure rate between the two best and two worst bases 
(Drnas, 1976). 
2) Hydraulic leaks tend to be likely in cold climates.  Also, avionic systems tend 
to fail more in wet climates (Tetmeyer, 1982). 
3) The demand rate for A-10’s at Nellis AFM was five times larger than that of 
other A-10 bases (Sherbrooke, 1997).   
Modifications 
This variable refers to effect of modernizing an aircraft on O&M costs.  In a 2003 
report titled, “Aging Aircraft: USAF Workload and Material Consumption Life Cycle 
Patterns”, Raymond Pyles of the RAND Corp. noted,  
“To our knowledge, there have been no previous studies of growth in age-related 
modification cost.  In the past, it may have been irrelevant, because only a few 
aircraft platforms were retained long enough to require upgrading to meet more-
modern operating requirements.  As likely, the data for such analyses have been 
difficult to obtain.” 
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 In conclusion, there are many other variables that influence O&M costs beyond 
age.  There has not been a single overarching study that has quantified the impact of each 
of these variables relative to one another.  Additionally, most of the variables analyzed 
have been operational factors such as ASD, Mission Type, and Utilization Rate.  As we 
shall see next, the search for the operational factors that best explained variation in O&M 
costs has culminated in the work performed by Logistic Management Institute.   
Logistic Management Institute’s Physics-Based Model 
In August of 2000, Mr. David Lee and Mr. John Wallace of the Logistics 
Management Institute developed a physics-based model that used other parameters 
besides hours to predict consumption costs (Lee, 2000).   Their analysis came as a result 
of poor forecasting for spare part during Operation Desert Storm (ODS).  During that 
contingency, the number of flying hours dramatically increased, but the consumption of 





Figure 6:  Projected and Actual C-5B Removals Before and During ODS 
 
In this instance, the proportional model terribly over-estimated the number of 
removals.  In their analysis, they stated, “to be consistently accurate, a material 
consumption model must consider more parameters than just flying hours” (Lee, 2000).  
They then choose to include the following variables in their model: time on the ground, 
sorties, and landings.  They then tested their model on F-16C, KC-10, and C-17 data from 




Table 5:  Comparison of Proportional Model to Physics-Based Model during OAF 
(F-16C bolded to emphasis system relevant to this thesis) 
Calibration Set Relative Error RMS Error Relative error RMS error
C-5B 1 203 212 -15.3 22.1
2 42.4 51.6 1 18.6
3 65.9 73.7 14.6 25.2
4 94.4 102.3 -4.24 18.38
C-17 1 24 25.5 -2.1 4.5
2 38.5 39.4 8.5 9.3
3 16.6 17.8 0.02 0.03
4 22.6 23.7 -2.4 3.1
KC-10 1 72.9 73.1 13.6 17.6
2 62 62.1 11.1 15.5
3 62.7 62.9 15.8 19.5
4 62.5 62.8 14.4 18.6
F-16C 1 23.5 29.7 -24 24.7
2 25.4 31.5 -1.8 10.3
3 14.2 22.1 -1.2 9.8
4 18.8 25.7 3.1 12
Proportional Model Physics-based Model
 
 
Their analysis used several different calibration sets, and therefore, produced 
different results.  Table 5 convincingly shows how proportional models are not useful 
when the flying profile dramatically changes.  In their own words, “Our investigation 
shows that this physics-based model is at least as accurate as the CPFH-based model in 
the general case, is far more accurate during wartime surges, and is generally more robust 





 This chapter began with an overview of the financial processes that create O&M 
budgets and then presented analysis by AFSAA that characterized the variability in 
annual expenditures for DLRs.  Their work showed that from 1998 to 2001 the variation 
in annual O&M expenditures was driven by a small number of different parts each year.  
Next, this chapter reviewed seven studies that quantified the relationship between aircraft 
age and cost.  These studies revealed that O&M costs typically increase 1.7 to 2.5 percent 
each year presumably due to the aging effect.  This research models the aging effect by 
both testing the previous year’s CPFH and by testing whether the average age of a fighter 
wing is predictive of a fighter wing’s CPFH.   
This chapter then followed with a summary of research that explored the impact 
of other variables on O&M costs.  This section revealed that there are many other 
variables besides the number of flight hours that influence O&M costs.  This section also 
showed that most of the previous research in this area has dealt with operational factors 
such as Mission Type, Utilization Rate, and ASD.  This chapter culminated in Logistic 
Management Institute’s physics based model that predicted O&M costs by using different 
operational factors (i.e. time on the ground, sorties, and landing).   Using this literature as 
a backdrop, this research identifies new, programmatic variables that are useful in 
predicting O&M costs.  Chapter 3 presents how this is accomplished.  Then in Chapter 4, 
these programmatic variables are combined with operational variables to create a model 






This chapter describes the process used to create the database and presents an 
overview of multiple linear regression.  Since there is not one database that contains 
operational, programmatic, and economic data, this research creates a database by 
combining data from two different sources, the Air Force Knowledge System (AFKS) 
database and the Air Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) database.  Both the AFKS 
and the AFTOC database contain the number of hours flown and this is used to check the 
validity of each data point.  After database creation is discussed, the removal of two data 
points is explained and the correlation among explanatory variables is presented.  This 
chapter then concludes with an overview of multiple linear regression, which is used in 
Chapter 4 during the model building portion of this research effort. 
Description of AFKS and AFTOC Databases 
Both the AFTOC and AFKS databases take data from a variety of sources and 
combine it into a central repository.  In fact, the AFKS database takes data from 26 
different databases and information systems and according to Gary Ahrens, Vice 
President of Bearing-Point Inc, is, “one of the larger government enterprise warehouses 
that we’re aware of” (Jackson, 2005).  Of the 26 databases, the data in AFKS mainly 
comes from the Reliability and Maintainability Information System (Jackson, 2005).  
This research uses historical, operational data from the AFKS database to test whether 
deployments influence the CPFH for F-16’s. 
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Similar to the AFKS database, the AFTOC database does not create any new data, 
but feeds data in from a variety sources, mainly the Air Force Core Automated 
Maintenance System and the Standard Base Supply System.  The purpose of the AFTOC 
database is to capture all the life cycle costs associated with a particular weapon system 
(Schmidt, 1999).  For this reason, the data in the AFTOC database is ideal for performing 
CPFH analysis.  The next section presents exactly what data is retrieved from the 
database for this research effort. 
Data Collected from the AFTOC Database 
The lead manager of the AFTOC database supplied three data sets, two of them 
are Microsoft Excel™ spreadsheets and the other is a Microsoft Access™ database.  All 
of this data originated from the AFTOC database.  Data set 1 contains the amount each 
fighter wing spent on DLR’s by year, by wing, and by MDS.  Included in this spreadsheet 
are the fields: number of aircraft assigned to that fighter wing and the number of hours 
flown.  Since current accounting system does not distinguish between dollars spent on F-
16C’s and F-16D’s, all of the F-16C/D’s fields are summed together.   Therefore, one 
row in this spreadsheet contained the fields: year, MajCOM, location of the base, Then-
Year (TY) obligations for DLRs, flying hours, number of aircraft in inventory, fighter 
wing, and MDS.  This spreadsheet contains data from 1996 to 2004.  Table 6 displays an 
example of this data set 1. 
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Table 6:  An Example of Data Set 1 
 
Year CMD Base Obligations Flying Hours Inventory Fighter Wing MDS
1996 ANG ANDREWS AFB (MD) $1,545,105.30 3884.100098 17.5 113th FW F-16C
1996 ANG ATLANTIC CITY ANG STN (NJ) $1,532,314.84 3734.199951 16.5 177th FW F-16C
1996 USAFE AVIANO AIR BASE (ITALY) $15,688,833.68 11523.2998 37.5 31st FW F-16C  
 
 
The second data includes a spreadsheet that lists every F-16 tail number along 
with the corresponding engine, engine manufacturer, and block number.  Since the first 
two digits in the tail number represent the year made (i.e. tail number 7800001 was made 
in 1978), this research adds the field, “Year Made”, to the spreadsheet.  An example of 
this data set is shown in Table 7. 
 
Table 7: An Example of Data Set 2 
 
TailNumber BlockNumber Engine Manufacturer Year Made MDS
85001450 30 F0110100 GE 1985 F-16C
85001452 25 F0100220 PW 1985 F-16C
85001453 30 F0110100 GE 1985 F-16C  
 
The third data set is an Access database and contains the fields: tail number, 
MDS, year, MajCOM, fighter wing, location of base, flying hours, and sorties.  Unlike 
data set 1 where one row represents the activities of one fighter wing, by MDS, by year, 
one row in this database represents the activities of a particular tail number.  Using the 
relational capabilities of Access, this data set contributes the following explanatory 
variables to the research effort: average age of fighter wing, percent of each block in 
fighter wing, percent of each engine in fighter wing, and ASD.  This database contains 
data from 1998 to 2004 and is shown in Table 8. 
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Table 8:  An Example of Data Set 3 
 
TailNumber MDS Year CMD Fighter Wing Possessing_Base Flying_Hours Sorties
83001157   F-16C 1999 ANG          174th FW SYRACUSE (NY)   1.1 1
83001157   F-16C 2000 ANG          174th FW SYRACUSE (NY)   0.9 1
83001157   F-16C 2001 ANG          174th FW SYRACUSE (NY)   1.1 1  
 
Data Collected from the AFKS Database 
The office, AF/XOOT, supplied this research with operational data from the 
AFKS database, denoted data set 4.  One row of this data contains the activities of a 
particular tail number and includes the fields: tail number, MDS, year, MajCOM, fighter 
wing, mission symbol, and hours.  AF/XOOT also sent a list of all the designated 
contingency mission symbols along with their description, denoted data set 5.  This data 
is in Appendix B.  From the AFKS data, this research obtains the percent each fighter 
wing was deployed from 1998 to 2004.  An example of data set 4 is shown in Table 9.    
 
Table 9:  An Example of Data Set 4 
 
TailNumber MDS Year CMD Fighter Wing Mission Symbol Hours
80000581   F-16A 2000 ang                        120th FW t3mt                       197.5
80000581   F-16A 2000 ang                        120th FW t3ex                       16.9
80000581   F-16A 2001 ang                        120th FW t3mt                       14.4  
 
 
Description of Explanatory Variables and Response 
This next section elaborates on the different variables used in the analysis. 
Response: Cost Per Flying Hour 
This is the amount of dollars expended by a wing on DLR’s divided by the 
number of hours flown by that fighter wing.  It is computed directly from data set 1.  All 
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costs in this analysis are converted to CY04$ using MajCOM specific conversion factors 
listed in Appendix C. 
Average Sortie Duration 
This is the total number of sorties a wing performed divided by the total number 
of hours flown.  This explanatory variable is computed from data set 3. 
Average Age 
This is the average age of all the F-16’s in the fighter wing.  It is computed by 
connecting the tail number information in data set 2 with the wing information in data set 
3. 
Percent Deployed 
This is the total amount of combat hours a wing has flown divided by the total 
number of hours flown.  It is computed by connecting the tail number information in data 
set 2 with data set 4.  Only hours whose mission symbols is on the list of designated 
contingency mission symbols are counted as combat hours.   
Percent Engine Type 
The F-16 has five different engines:  F0100229, F0100220, F0100200, F0110129, 
and F0110100.   Unfortunately, data set 2 does not distinguish between the engines 
F0100200 and F0100220, and therefore, aircraft with either of those engines are counted 
together.  The grouping of these two engines reduces the inferential power of this 
variable.  This research uses four explanatory variables to describe this category.  For 
example, one explanatory variable is the percent of the wing that has engine F0100200 or 
33 
 
F0100220.  Another explanatory variable is the percent of the wing that has engine 
F0100229, and so on.  Each of these explanatory variables are computed by connecting 
data set 2 with data set 3. 
Percent Block 
As the F-16 has matured, the Air Force has maintained its status as a premier 
tactical fighter by making block upgrades.  The United States Air Force currently has 
seven F-16C/D blocks in service: 25, 30, 32, 40, 42, 50 and 52.  Each block represents a 
significant technological improvement from the previous block.  For detailed information 
regarding what improvements were made by block number, visit the website 
http://www.faqs.org/docs/air/avf162.html.  Similar to the coding scheme used in the 
previous explanatory variable, this research uses seven different variables to capture the 
block effect.  This data is computed by connecting data set 2 with data set 3.  
MajCOM 
This is simply the MajCOM the wing is assigned to.  This research analyzes Air 
Education and Training Command, Air Combat Command, United States Air Force in 
Europe, Pacific Air Forces, and the Air National Guard.  Air Force Material Command is 
was removed from the analysis because of the accounting system used is fundamentally 
different than the other commands. 
Location 
This explanatory variable describes the location the wing is assigned to.  This 




This explanatory variable is defined as the numbers of hours flown divided by the 
number of aircraft.  It is computed directly from data set 1. 
Lag 1 CPFH 
This explanatory variable is the previous year’s DLR obligations divided by the 
previous year’s hours flown.  It is computed from data set 1. 
Database Summary 
Table 10 displays all of the variables this research analyzes and the data set from 
which they came from.  Variables connected by multiple data sets are computed by using 
the relational capability of Access.   
 
Table 10:  Relationship Between Explanatory Variable and Data Source  
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
DLR Expenditures X
CPFH X
Hours X X X
Average Sortie Duration X
Average Aircraft Age X X
Percent Deployed X X
Percent Engine Manufacture X X
Percent Engine Type X X




Lag 1 CPFH X
Data Set
AFTOC AFKS




 Most impressively, this database has all of this data for 40 of 44 Air Force fighter 
wings from 1998 to 2004.  Air Force Material Command’s three fighter wings are not 
included because of differences in accounting system and data set 1 did not include the 
53d fighter wing out of Eglin AFB.  The main limitation of this database is that the 
explanatory variables, percent engine type and percent block, are computed with the 
assumption that the current configuration of these aircraft has not changed significantly 
from 2004.  More analysis on this limitation is presented in Chapter 4. 
Categorical Coding Scheme 
The variables MajCOM and Base are categorical variables with levels 5 and 40, 
respectively.  To isolate the effects of each individual level, a “0” or “1” coding scheme 
is adopted.  This research creates a dummy variable for each level of the categorical 
variable minus one.  The effect of the level that does not have an assigned dummy 
variable is captured in the intercept.  Therefore, each dummy variable is assigned a “1” if 
that data point includes that level or a “0” if it does not.  In this way, the effect of each 
level is ascertained. 
Validation of Database 
 Since the AFTOC and AFKS database contained a common field, hours flown, 
this analysis investigated whether or not this field matches between data sources and data 
sets by plotting the hours field from the three main data sets.  This is shown in Figure 7. 
The match between these two databases is not entirely exact.  There is some 
unaccounted for variation between the two.  However, this variation is less than seven 
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tenths of one percent of the total variation.  For the purposes of this research, the 
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Figure 7:  Scatterplot and Correlation Matrix of AFKS and AFTOC Hours 
  
Removal of Two of Mountain Home’s of Data Points 
This research noticed that two data points, both from Mountain Home AFB, were 
extremely dissimilar then the rest of the data.  Figure 8 displays a histogram of the 
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standardized CPFH (i.e the distribution of the CPFH is transformed such that the mean is 
zero and the variance is one).  One would expect ninety-nine percent of the observations 
to fall within three standard deviations of the mean.  As one can see, these data point’s 
CPFH are 4.6 and 4.87 standard deviations away from the mean.  For a sample size of 
265, this is a statistical aberration. 
 












































Figure 8:  Histogram of the Standardized CPFH 
(Squared data points reflect two extreme outliers) 
 
Another way to compare these data points to other data points is to plot CPFH by 
fighter wing.  This is plotted in Figure 9 along with the quartiles.  Notice the spike from 
these two data points.   
 This research cannot explain why the two of Mt. Home AFB data points are 
abnormally large.   Henceforward, the two points squared in Figure 9 are removed from 
the analysis for being a major outliers.  In Chapter 4, this research concludes that all of 
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Figure 9:  CPFH by Fighter Wing 
(Data points from Mt. Home AFB are circled and the two outliers are squared for effect) 
  
Correlation between Explanatory Variables 
This research also notes that the explanatory variables ASD, utilization rate, and 
percent deployed are correlated.  This is observed in Figure 10.  When explanatory 
variables are correlated, determining which variable belongs in the model and which 
variable does not becomes more difficult.  For example, ice cream consumption and 
temperature are correlated.  When the weather warms up, people tend to eat more ice 
cream.  Temperature and crime rates are also correlated.  The colder months tend to keep 
people inside whereas the warmer months give individuals the opportunity to vandalize.  
If one develops a model to predict crime rates and includes ice cream consumption as an 
explanatory variable, he or she may erroneous conclude that it is predictive when in fact, 
there is only a mathematical association, not a causal relationship.   This faulty 
conclusion came about because the analyst failed to identify the lurking variable, 
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temperature.  Further analysis of which of these three correlated variables, utilization 
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Figure 10:  Correlations Among Three Explanatory Variables 
An Overview of Multiple Linear Regression 
According to Montgomery (2001), regression models are useful for data 
description, parameter estimation, and prediction.  In general, multiple linear regression 
determines the functional form of a response, y, to a series of k explanatory variables as 




εβββββ ++++++= kk xxxxy ...3322110      (1) 
 
Regression, then, estimates each of the beta’s coefficients, denoted βi.  These 
estimates represent the expected change in the response for a unit change in Xi given all 
other variables are held constant. There are several techniques by which these parameters 
are estimated.  This research uses the method of least squares where the sum of the 
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 is minimized where  
kki xxxxy βββββ ˆ...ˆˆˆˆˆ 3322110 +++++=  
In matrix form, the estimate for the vector is given by:  β̂
yXXX ′′= −1)(β̂  
where y is a column vector with each entry is the observed CPFH for a fighter wing and 
X is a matrix with each column corresponding to the explanatory variable.  
Chapter Summary 
This chapter began by discussing the two data sources where the five sets of data 
originated.  Then this chapter described how the five sets of data were used to develop 
the various explanatory variables in the database.  Following that discussion, this chapter 
verified the data by comparing a common field, hours.  Further investigation of the data 
revealed two data points that were extremely dissimilar then the rest and they were 
subsequently removed.   Following their removal, this chapter identified three 
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explanatory variables that were correlated: ASD, utilization rate, and percent deployed.  
This chapter’s closing discussion on multiple linear regression leads the way to the next 
chapter, Results and Analysis.  The next chapter uses the database developed in this 
chapter to answer the investigative questions and to develop a model to predict the CPFH 




IV. Results and Analysis 
Chapter Overview 
In this chapter, this research uses the database created in Chapter 3 in combination 
with the information from the literature review in Chapter 2 to solve the investigation 
questions presented in Chapter 1.  These questions are answered in the following manner.  
First, the results of one-way analysis of variance are given.   These results do not consider 
the synergistic or antagonistic effects, also known as interaction effects, between the 
other explanatory variables.  The results of this analysis are then used to develop a model 
to predict the CPFH of an F-16C/D fighter wing.  Unlike the one-way analysis, this 
model does take into account synergistic and antagonistic effects between explanatory 
variables.  The 2004 data is withheld during the model building process and used to 
validate the model.  Once the model is validated, the 2004 data is reinserted into the 
database.  Then, all the explanatory variables that were not found to be significant during 
the initial model building portion are one at a time tested again to see if the 2004 data 
changes their significance.  After that investigation is complete, a final model is 
determined and the relative influence of each explanatory variable is computed by 
comparing the standardized beta coefficients.  This chapter closes with an analysis of the 
key assumption that states that the configuration of each fighter wing has not 
significantly changed since 1998.   
One-Way Analysis of Variance 
Table 11 presents the analytical results of the one-way analysis variance using 
single linear regression.  These results do not consider the influence of other variables on 
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the response, the CPFH, but they do shed light on the first nine investigative questions.  
Question 10 requires the use of multiple linear regression and is addressed following the 
model building portion of this research.  For each of the hypothesis tests performed in 
Table 11, the null hypothesis is that the beta coefficient corresponding to that explanatory 
variable is equal to zero, while the alternative is that it is not equal to zero. 
Although this analysis does not consider the influence of other explanatory 
variables, it is insightful and is the first step in answering the investigative questions.  
The explanatory variables that appear to be significant are: lag 1 CPFH, ASD, engine 
type, block, MajCOM, and base.  The direction and magnitude of their influence can be 
determined by the sign and absolute value of the beta coefficient.  To account for the 
synergistic and antagonistic effects between explanatory variables, this research uses 
multiple linear regression to develop a predictive model of the CPFH.  The steps taken to 
build this model are presented next. 
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Table 11:  One-Way Analysis of Variance For All Explanatory Variables
(Shaded variables indicate significance at 0.05 confidence level.  Bases not included are 
not significant) 
Explanatory Variable Beta Coefficent Std Error p-value
Average Age -3.12 16.95 0.854
Percent Deployed -1115.54 615.65 0.0711
Lag 1 CPFH 0.403 0.0522 < 0.0001
ASD -956.57 223.93 < 0.0001
Utilization Rate -3.3641 1.04 0.0015
Percent Engine F0100200/F0100220 576.82 109.38 < 0.0001
Percent Engine F0100229 853.81 244.49 0.0006
Percent Engine F0110129 -632.05 191.73 0.0011
Percent Engine F0110100 -467.52 103.18 < 0.0001
Percent Block 25 588.91 141.86 < 0.0001
Percent Block 30 -621.43 106.43 < 0.0001
Percent Block 32 1457.04 382.33 0.0002
Percent Block 40 189.42 155.25 0.2235
Percent Block 42 212.96 176.9 0.2297
Percent Block 50 -630.07 190.91 0.0011
Percent Block 52 853.81 244.49 0.0006
MajCOM = ANG -355.41 110.4 0.0014
MajCOM = ACC 630.69 146.77 < 0.0001
MajCOM = AETC 524.54 326.48 0.1093
MajCOM = PACAF -115.65 171.06 0.499
MajCOM = USAFE -12.26 235.23 0.958
Base = SELFRIDGE ANG BASE (MI) -622.31 325.82 0.0572
Base = BUCKLEY ANG BASE (CO) -662.06 325.52 0.043
Base = ELLINGTON (TX) 985.74 322.36 0.0025
Base = ATLANTIC CITY ANG STN (NJ) 623.93 325.81 0.0566
Base = SHAW AFB (SC) -872.6 323.61 0.0075
Base = MISAWA AIR BASE (JAPAN) -695.13 325.25 0.0335
Base = MOUNTAIN HOME AFB (ID) 767.49 383.76 0.0465
Base = NELLIS AFB (NV) 2334.68 294.55 < 0.0001
*  Base = EIELSON AFB (AK) -355.57 327.35 0.2784
* = Not Significant in One-Way Analysis but Significant in Final Model  
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Model Building Process 
The process that determines the best possible functional form between the CPFH 
and the explanatory variables is not accomplished using a straight-forward, turn-the-
crank procedure.  Black-box programs, such as Stepwise and best subsets regression, fail 
to properly handle correlations between explanatory variables and fail to communicate to 
the analyst key differences between competing models.  They rely on a single measure of 
effectiveness, R2, that can be artificially inflated by adding more explanatory variables.  
Even worse, these black-box programs completely ignore the standard regression 
assumptions of normality, constant variance, and independence.  Singer and Willet 
(2003) best summarize the danger of using black-box algorithms for variable selection:  
 
“Never let a computer select predictors mechanically.  The computer does 
not know your research questions nor the literature upon which they rest. 
It cannot distinguish predictors of direct substantive interest from those 
whose effects you want to control.” 
 
 For these reasons, this research did not use Stepwise and chose instead to analyze 
the data by carefully examining individual leverage plots and by plotting the residuals of 
various models against each explanatory variable.  This approach revealed how the 
different explanatory variables interact and identifies which explanatory variables are 
essential to the model and which are not.   
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An examination of the data using these techniques reveals that the ANG fighter 
wings behave much differently then the active duty fighter wings.  Not only is the 
dummy variable ANG significant, but even more importantly, the beta coefficients for the 
other variables change considerably when the ANG units are excluded from the model.  
Some descriptive statistics help explain why the ANG fighter wings behave 
fundamentally different then the other active duty fighter wings.   
Figures 11 and 12 display the distribution of the response, CPFH, for ANG fighter 
wings and for active duty fighter wings.  As Figure 11 and Figure 12 show, there is 
considerable difference between the distribution of the ANG and active duty FW’s 
CPFH.  Additionally, the mean of the two distributions are significantly different as noted 
by the 95% confidence interval listed.  Further contributing to the differences is the 
average number of hours each of these fighter wings fly a year.  This is presented in 





























































































Figure 12:  Histogram and CDF Plot of Active Duty FW’s CPFH 
 

















Figure 13:  Histogram of Hours Flown for ANG FWs 
 

















Figure 14:  Histogram of Hours Flown for Active Duty FWs 
 
 Figures 13 and 14 reinforce the claim that there are inherent differences between 
ANG and active duty fighter wings.  Active duty fighter wings fly almost four times as 
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many hours as ANG fighter wings and have a standard deviation that is nearly 10 times 
as large.  Due to these major differences, two models are built, one for ANG fighter 
wings and one for active duty fighter wings. 
The first model, named Model A, relates the CPFH of active duty fighter wings to 
four explanatory variables, utilization rate, DV(Nellis), DV(Alaska), and percent block 
50.  The second model, named Model B, relates the CPFH of ANG fighter wings to four 
explanatory variables: utilization rate, DV(NJ), DV(Ellington), and percent block 30.  For 
each model, this research chose these variables with great care and after considerable 
time testing various combinations of explanatory variables.  Additionally, both of these 
models were built without the 2004 data.  Figures 15 and 16 display the results for Model 
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Figure 16:  Model B, ANG FW Model 
 
 There are three important differences between these two models.  First, the 
change in the beta coefficient that corresponds to the utilization rate changes from -3.66 
in Model A to -5.71 in Model B.  This difference signals that the ANG’s CPFH cannot be 
modeled by simply adjusting it up or down my fixed rate.  The rate at which changes in 
utilization rate affect the CPFH are different between ANG and active duty fighter wings.  
Second, the explanatory variables that best describe the functional form of the response 
also change.  The explanatory variable “percent block 50” in Model A is replaced by the 
explanatory variable “percent block 30” in Model B.  This change is due to the higher 
number of block 50’s in active duty fighter wings and the higher number of block 30’s in 
an ANG fighter wing.  Using the database created in Chapter 3, the average ANG fighter 
wing has 52% Block 30s and no Block 50s where as the average active duty fighter wing 
has 25% Block 50s and 10% Block 30s.  Appendix D lists the percent of each block by 
both ANG and active duty fighter wings.  Finally, the last key difference between these 
two models is the large difference in the adj R2 between the two models, 0.74 in Model A 
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as compared to 0.306 in Model B.  This difference describes how well the model fits the 
data and is further supported by the difference in F-Ratios, 52 in Model A and only 17.55 
in Model B.  In short, operational and programmatic variables appear to be better at 
predicting the CPFH for active duty fighter wings then for ANG fighter wings.  Next, the 
residuals are checked to ensure the three assumptions, normality, constant variance, and 
independence, are not violated and any overly influential data points along with any 
extreme outliers are identified. 
Residual Diagnostics 
Normality Assumption 
The objective test for the assumption of normality is accomplished by fitting a 
standard normal distribution to the standardized residuals and performing a Shapiro-Wilk 
Goodness of Fit test.  The null hypothesis for this test is that the distribution is normally 
distributed.  As Figures 17 and 18 show, Model A passes the objective test, but Model B 
does not.  This is determined by recalling the null hypothesis for the Shapiro-Wilk test is 
that the distribution is normally distributed.  Therefore, a p-value below 0.05 for this 
hypothesis test tells the reader to reject the null hypothesis in favor of the alternate 
hypothesis.  Also recall that Model A has 74 observations while Model B has 151 
observations.  The larger sample size of Model B makes it more difficult to pass this test 
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Figure 17:  Shapiro-Wilk Goodness of Fit Test for Model A  
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Figure 18:  Shapiro-Wilk Goodness of Fit Test for Model B  
 
Both model’s residuals are mound shaped, and therefore, pass the subjective test 
for normality.  Model B contains one moderate outlier which is causing the minor 
deviation from the assumption of normality.  With this data point excluded, the model 
passes the assumption (p-value = 0.181).  Regression is robust to deviations in normality 
such as these.  
Constant Variance Assumption 
The objective test for the constant variance assumption is accomplished using the 
Breusch-Pagan test.  This is accomplished and the results are listed in Table 12.   Figures 




Table 12: Breusch-Pagan Constant Variance Test for Models A and B 
(Shaded row indicates failure of Constant Variance Test) 
SSE (Full) SSR (Reduced) Predictors Sample Size
Test 
Statistic p-value
Model A 13844455 6.97E+11 5 74 9.96 0.0764
Model B 74954796 8.69E+12 5 151 17.63 0.00344
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As seen in Table 12, Model B fails the objective test for constant variance since 
the alternate hypothesis of the Breusch-Pagan test is that the model does not pass the 
assumption of constant variance.  There appears to be a slight diamond shape in the 
residuals and the Breusch-Pagan test is detecting it.  Since regression is robust to minor 
deviations from this assumption, Model B is still a usable model.  The impact of this 
deviation is that the actual p-values may be slightly different then stated 
Independence Assumption 
Unlike the assumption of normality and constant variance, regression is not robust 
to deviations in the assumption of independence.  Without additionally modeling, the p-
values could be much larger or much smaller then calculated.  The Durbin-Watson test is 
typically used to detect a lag 1 autocorrelation.  This test can not be implemented on 
either model since there are only six data points per fighter wing and it would be 
nonsensical to compute the autocorrelation between the different fighter wings.  This 
research opts to validate this assumption by inserting the lag 1 CPFH explanatory 
variable and testing whether the corresponding beta coefficient is equal to zero or not.  
This test is not equivalent to the Durbin-Watson test, but it does give insights to whether 
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Figure 22:  Model B’s Test for Independence 
 
 From this analysis, both of these models pass this critical assumption, though the 
p-value for Model B is borderline (p –value = 0.083).  To complete the residual 
diagnostics, overly influential data points and extreme outliers are identified.  Figures 23 

















































Figure 24:  Cook’s Distance Overlay Plot for Model B 
 
 Since there are no data points with a Cook’s Distance of 0.5 or greater, there are 
no overly influential data points in either of these models.  Additionally, from Figures 17 
and 18, there are no data points with a studentized residual over 4.0, therefore the data 
did not contain any extreme outliers.  In Chapter 3, two data points were removed 
because they had an abnormally large CPFH.  If those points are reinserted into Model A, 
the R2 – adj drops to 0.52 and the studentized residuals of the two data points are 5.5 and 
4.5.   Obviously, these two data points do not belong in the analysis.  
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Model Performance and Validation 
Several of the explanatory variables are not known prior to the year of execution 
and, therefore, they have to be forecasted out.  For the purposes of this research, the 
previous year’s values are used as an estimate.  In practice, identifying a more accurate 
estimate of the explanatory variables will yield better results.  Using this forecasting 
technique, the Mean Absolute Percent Error (MAPE) and defined in Equation 2, is 
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Figure 26:  MAPE for ANG Test Set 
 
 Additionally, the research uses the test set to validate the model by creating a 95% 
prediction interval and determining what percentage of the time the test set data fell 
within the range.  Table 13 displays the results of this test.  One would expect roughly 
95% of the observations to fall in this range.  Since this is the case, then the model is 
working properly. 
 
Table 13:  Validation Results 
Model A Model B
Test Set Sample Size 27 12
Number of Squadrons within 
95% Prediction Interval 26 11
Percent of Squadrons within 95 
% Prediction Interval 96.2% 91.7%  
 
Since both of these models pass the standard regression assumptions and are 
validated using the 2004 test set, this research now considers them to be legitimate.  The 
2004 data is now reinserted back into the database.  This is done for two reasons.  First, 
this research investigates how much the beta coefficients change when the 2004 data is 
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added to the database.  If the beta coefficients drastically change, then that would be a 
source of concern over the validity of the model.  Secondly, with this larger database, 7 
data points per fighter wing instead of 6, this research investigates whether any of the 
explanatory variables initially not included in the model actually belong in the model.  
Re-insertion of 2004 Data 
Effect on Beta Coefficients 
Towards the first reason for reinserting the 2004 data, this research identifies the 
percent change by re-computing the beta coefficients.  These next set of models, denoted 
Model C for active duty fighter wings and Model D for ANG fighter wings, are shown in 
Figure 27 and Figure 28.  The only difference between these and Models A and B is that 
the 2004 data is reinserted.  Following these figures, Figure 29 displays the percent 
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Figure 28:  Model D, Active Duty FW’s Updated Model 
 
 
Table 14:  Percent Change in Beta Coefficients 
Model A Model C Percent Change Model B Model D Percent Change
Intercept 4106 4100 0.1% Intercept 4217.4 4106 2.6%
Utilization Rate -3.66 -3.699 1.1% Utilization Rate -5.71 -5.61 1.8%
%50 -932.9 -889.5 4.7% %30 -688.9 -578.47 16.0%
DV(Nellis) 1599 1711.5 7.0% DV(NJ) 623.3 651.3 4.5%
DV(Alaska) -841 -687.6 18.2% DV(Ellington) 858.6 725 15.6%
Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate
 
 
 The reader should notice that most of the parameters changed very little while 
three of the parametes, (i.e DV(Alaska), DV(Ellington), and %30) changed more then 
15%.  In all three cases, the new estimate is less than one standard deviation of the 
original estimate.  Therefore, the new parameter estimates are very similar to the original 
estimates. 
 Now that the influence of adding the 2004 test data has been captured, this 
research turns its attention to analyzing the variables that were not predictive with the 
2004 data removed. 
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Analysis of Excluded Variables Using the Updated/Validated Models 
Table 11 displays the significance of each explanatory variable without 
considering the antagonistic and synergistic effects of other variables.  Now that a model 
has been developed and validated, variables not included in the model are reintroduced 
and their significance is determined while considering the effects of other variables.   
This is accomplished by introducing a variable into the model one at a time and then 
testing the beta coefficient.  The same hypothesis used in the one-way analysis is used in 
this analysis.  Additionally, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) score is documented.  
The VIF scores are used to determine if the information added by the introduction of this 
variable is redundant or not. Tables 15 and 16 displays the results for each groups of 
fighter wings. 
Although Table 15 and Table 16 include the p-value for the original one-way 
analysis, recall that this analysis was done with database including both ANG and active 
duty fighter wings.  Also take note that Table 15 does not include the explanatory 
variables Percent Block 50 and Percent Engine F0110129 since no ANG fighter wings 
contained Block 50s or engines of this type.  
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Table 15:  Significance of Excluded Explanatory Variables for ANG FWs 
(Shaded variables indicate significance at 0.05 confidence level.  Bases not included are 
not significant) 
Explanatory Variable Original p-value New p-value New VIF
Average Age 0.854 0.79 1.08
Percent Deployed 0.0711 0.8835 1.14
Lag 1 CPFH < 0.0001 0.0137 1.21
ASD < 0.0001 0.765 2.33
Percent Engine F0100200/F0100220 < 0.0001 0.43 5.1
Percent Engine F0100229 0.0006 0.213 1.08
Percent Engine F0110100 < 0.0001 0.593 16.9
Percent Block 25 < 0.0001 0.214 1.97
Percent Block 32 0.0002 0.781 1.03
Percent Block 40 0.2235 0.593 1.01
Percent Block 42 0.2297 0.045 1.41
Percent Block 52 0.0006 0.213 1.08
Base = SELFRIDGE ANG BASE (MI) 0.0572 0.841 1.05









Table 16:  Significance of Excluded Explanatory Variables for Active Duty FWs 
 
Explanatory Variable Original p-value New p-value VIF
Average Age 0.854 0.235 1.32
Percent Deployed 0.0711 0.819 2.02
Lag 1 CPFH < 0.0001 0.748 2.01
ASD < 0.0001 0.0624 3.92
Percent Engine F0100200/F0100220 < 0.0001 0.817 1.52
Percent Engine F0100229 0.0006 0.058 1.09
Percent Engine F0110129 0.0011 0.607 1,711.5
Percent Engine F0110100 < 0.0001 0.123 2.33
Percent Block 25 < 0.0001 0.739 1.08
Percent Block 30 < 0.0001 0.478 1.16
Percent Block 32 0.0002 0.397 1231.1
Percent Block 40 0.2235 0.315 1.99
Percent Block 42 0.2297 0.85 1.56
Percent Block 52 0.0006 0.058 1.09
MajCOM = ACC < 0.0001 0.47 1.25
MajCOM = AETC 0.1093 0.738 1.08
MajCOM = PACAF 0.499 0.34 1.27
MajCOM = USAFE 0.958 0.0645 1.19
Base = SHAW AFB (SC) 0.0075 0.055 1.37
Base = MISAWA AIR BASE (JAPAN) 0.0335 0.717 1.38
Base = MOUNTAIN HOME AFB (ID) 0.0465 0.0644 1.04  
 
 Recall in that in the original one-way analysis, Table 11, that the majority of 
explanatory variables tested significant.  As stated earlier, the downfall of the one-way 
analysis is that it does not account for synergistic or antagonistic effects between 
explanatory variables.  Now that a model have been developed, the true influence of these 
explanatory is tested.  The result is that many of the explanatory variables that were 
originally significant are not (i.e ASD, Percent Engine, Percent Block, MajCOM, and 
Base) and one that was not significant is now significant, that being DV(Alaska).  Also 
noteworthy from Table 16 is the VIF score for Percent Block 32 and Percent Engine 
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F0110129.  This research interprets the extraordinarily high VIF scores as an indicator 
that an explanatory variable is contributing redundant information.    
Modifications of Validated Models 
Modifiying the ANG Model 
For the original ANG model, Model A, recall that when the Lag 1 CPFH variable 
was introduced, the p-value was only 0.083.  With the addition of the 2004 data, the p-
value drops to 0.0137.  Because of this, this research concluded that this explanatory 
variable does belong in the model.  In Chapter 2, there were 7 studies that quantified the 
relationship between aircraft age and O&M costs.  They found that the on average, O&M 
costs increase at a rate of 1.7% to 2.5% a year.  This effect is partially modeled in the Lag 
1 CPFH explanatory variable.  The fact that this variable is significant in ANG fighter 
wings and not in the active duty fighter wings further highlights the major differences 
between them.   
For ANG fighter wings, the explanatory variable, Block 40, also became 
significant when the 2004 data was added.  This research tested a variety of models with 
Block 40, and in every case, the R2 – Adj of those models was smaller then the original 
model.   
Therefore, this research concludes that the final model for ANG fighter wings 
should include the Lag 1 CPFH and not any additional variables.  Figure 29 displays the 
characteristics of this final model for ANG fighter wings, denoted Model E.  The 
diagnostics were checked of this model and they the same as Model B. Next, this 
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Figure 29: Model E, Final Model for ANG FWs 
  
Modifying the Active Duty FW Model 
Table 15 shows that when each explanatory variable is re-introduced one at a time 
into the model, none of them are significant.  But, when this research did this analysis, it 
noticed that these results were being skewed by a single fighter wing’s data.  As an 
illustration, Figure 30 displays the leverage plot of the explanatory variable Average 
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Figure 30:  Leverage Plot Average Aircraft Age 
(1998 Mt. Home data point squared for effect) 
 
 This research noticed that this one data point appears to greatly influence the 
slope, making it appear smaller than it is actually is.  Also, the fact that every study in 
Chapter 2 stated that O&M costs increase with increasing age of aircraft further 
supported the belief that this explanatory variable should be statistically significant.  
Therefore, the response was regressed against the same four explanatory variables with 
this point excluded.  Figure 31 displays these new results.  This new model includes 2004 
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Figure 31:  Model C with Mt. Home’s 1998 Data Point Removed 
 
 Noticed the significant improvement of R2 – adj and the steep drop in the p-value 
corresponding to the variable Average Aircraft Age, from 0.23 to 0.0258.   Not 
surprisingly, this data point belonged to the same base that had two other points removed 
for being extremely dissimilar, Mt. Home AFB.  Removing this point would be the third 
of the seven data points removed from base.  This research questioned the integrity of the 
data from this base.  To further investigate the effect this base is having on the model, the 
other four data points are excluded and the same model is regressed.  Figure 32 displays 






Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response











    5
   75




















































Figure 32: Active Duty Model with 2004 Data and Without Mt. Home AFB’s Data 
 
 Notice how the R2 – adj continues to climb while the p-value corresponding to the 
Average Age of Aircraft drops by another order of magnitude.  This research concludes 
that there is a high likelihood that this base’s data is suspect.  Additionally, the purpose of 
this model is to capture a typical response from a F-16 fighter wing.  The data from Mt. 
Home AFB appears to be atypical.  For both of these reasons, this data is removed from 
the analysis. 
Following the removal of Mt. Home’s data, the residuals are analyzed and this 
research discovers the presence of an overly influential data point (Cook’s Distance of 
0.79).  Figure 33 displays the explanatory variable that it is overly influencing, utilization 
rate.  The data point in question is the 31st FW out of Aviano Italy in 1999.  This research 
further investigated this point and found the utilization rate was 550 hrs/aircraft for the 
year in question.  Additionally, this wing was deployed for over 50% of the time in direct 
support of Operation ALLIED FORCE.  To determine how atypical this utilization rate 
is, this research standardized the explanatory variable, utilization rate, and determined 
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that this observation was 5.5 standard deviations from the mean.  During this eight year 
time period, the next closest wing had a utilization rate of only 420 hrs/aircraft and this 
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Figure 33:  Leverage Plot of the Influence of Data Point on Utilization Rate 
(Overly influential data point square for effect) 
 
 
 Now that all the overly influential and suspect data has been removed and all the 
predictive explanatory variables have been identified, this research presents its final 
model for predicting the CPFH for active duty fighter wings, denoted Model F, and 
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Figure 34:  Model F, Final Model for Active Duty FWs 
 
 Notice how all the p-values significantly dropped and how the R2 – adj climbed.  
Also of interest for this final model is the leverage plot of the average aircraft age 
explanatory variable.   Recall that this variable was not significant during the one-way 
analysis or during the model-building with the Mt. Home data included.  Now that those 
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Determining the Relative Influence of Each Explanatory Variable 
The relative influence of each explanatory variable is determined by directly 
comparing the magnitude of each standardized beta coefficient.   Before the model is 
regressed, each explanatory variable is standardized.   That is, the distribution of each 
explanatory variable is transformed such that its mean is zero and the variance is one.  
This process of standardization removes complications created when explanatory 
variables have different units.  Once the response is regressed upon the standardized 
explanatory variables, the resulting beta coefficients are dimensionless and can be 
compared with one another to determine which explanatory variable is the most 
influential.  Figures 36 and 37 present the computed standardized beta coefficients for 
























































































































































Figure 39: Relative Influence of Explanatory Variables for Active Duty FW’s 
 
 Although this research modeled ANG and active duty fighter wings separately, 
the relative influence of the main explanatory variables are very similar.  Both Utilization 
Rate and Percent Block variables are negative and roughly the same when compared to 
one another and to the other explanatory variables.  Likewise, the Average Age 
explanatory variable for active duty fighter wings is very similar is ANG’s Lag 1 CPFH.  
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This observation supports the claim that both of these variables are measuring the same 
effect.  Also noteworthy is the magnitude of the explanatory variable DV(Nellis).  More 
discussion is presented in Chapter 5, but this research believes that it is not the location of 
the base that is causing the CPFH to much larger then other bases.  Rather, this research 
believes it is due to the fact that one of the two squadrons assigned to this base is the Air 
Force’s demo team, the Thunderbirds.      
 
The Year Effect 
The year variable is not used in any of the models and therefore, these models are 
useful for any time period.  Though this variable is not used, analysis of this variable 
yields some interesting insights.  Figures 40 displays the one-way analysis of variance of 
the CPFH by year for all active duty fighter wings.  Figure 41 duplicates this analysis 
only with the residuals of Model F as the response instead of the CPFH.  Also in Figure 
41 is Tukey’s pairwise comparisons that show which years are significantly different.  
This is shown by the comparison circles, which is a visual display of each year’s mean.  









































Levels not connected by same letter are signif icantly different
Comparisons for all pairs using Tukey-Kramer HSD
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Levels not connected by same letter are signif icantly different
Comparisons for all pairs using Tukey-Kramer HSD
Means Comparisons
Oneway Analysis of Residual By Year
 
Figure 43:  One-Way Analysis of Model E’s Residuals by Year 
 
 
 These figures support the claim that there is another lurking variable in both the 
active duty and ANG fighter wings.  Additionally, this variable appears to have a stronger 
influence among ANG fighter wings.  This research also notices that for both groups of 
fighter wings, there is the same general trend in both the one-way analysis of the response 
and the residuals.  For example, among active duty fighter wings, the years 1998 to 2001 
there is a general increase.  Additionally, in 2002 there is a sudden drop followed by a 
steep increase in 2003.  In both figures, the distribution goes slightly down in 2004.  The 
same phenomenon occurs in the ANG fighter wings as well.  Therefore, the mechanism 
that is driving this variation is not accounted for by the explanatory variables included in 
either model.  There is at least one other variable that is significantly influencing the 
CPFH besides these operational and programmatic variables.   
 Even though the explanatory variable ASD is not significant if re-introduced back 
into the final model (p-value of 0.129 for Active duty fighter wings and 0.46 for ANG 
fighter wings) the changes in ASD by year appear to inversely related to the same trend 
seen in the both the response and residuals.  Figures 44 and 45 display the changes in 
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ASD by year for both active duty and ANG fighter wings along with comparison circles 
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Levels not connected by same letter are signif icantly dif ferent
Comparisons for all pairs using Tukey-Kramer HSD
Means Comparisons
Oneway Analysis of ASD By Year
 
Figure 45:  One-Way Analysis of ASD by Year for Active Duty FWs 
 
 The similarities between Figure 44 and Figures 42 and 43 and between Figure 45 
and Figures 40 and 41 are prominent, but not statistically significant.   For one, these 
figures show that the ASD varies more from year to year in ANG fighter wings then 
active duty fighter wings.   Even if this explanatory variable is not the culprit for the 
“Year Effect”, these figures support the claim that major changes in mission profile 
occurred in 2002.  Perhaps these changes in mission profile, which are correlated with 
ASD, caused the “Year Effect”.     
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Reasonableness of Key Assumption 
The key assumption that this research makes is that the block number that a 
particular F-16 has in 2004 is the same for every year going back to 1998.  AFTOC is in 
the process of creating a database that contains the historic block number by tail number 
by year.  Until this database is completed, analysis must be performed with this 
assumption. 
To ensure that this is a reasonable assumption, this research excluded all the data 
points except for a particular year.  Then, the beta coefficients were estimated for that 
year.  This process was repeated for each year.  In this manner, the significance of the 
block explanatory was determined independently of future years.  Then, the sign and 
magnitude of the beta coefficient along with the statistical significance of this variable is 
compared across this timeframe.  Table 17 presents the results of this analysis. 
 
Table 17:  Block Parameter Estimation for Both Models by Year 
 
Year Beta Coefficient Std error p-value Year Beta Coefficient Std error p-value
1998 -1777.9 516 0.0088 1998 -549 174.5 0.0053
1999 -1190 185.6 0.0002 1999 -1175 256.98 0.0002
2000 -574.34 267.4 0.0688 2000 -713.8 381.9 0.0771
2001 -629.18 246.64 0.038 2001 -1147.39 176.25 < 0.0001
2002 -1014.26 324.1 0.0166 2002 -222.26 349.4 0.5316
2003 -459.81 353.3 0.23 2003 -418.2 221.76 0.072
2004 -571.3 291.9 0.0913 2004 23.01 189.03 0.904
Overall -889.5 121.56 < 0.0001 Overall -578.47 114.6 < 0.0001




This research believes this is a reasonable assumption because the p-values 
corresponding to the block variable are small for the years 1998 and 1999.  If a 
significant percentage of the aircraft changed configurations during the past eight years, 
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then these early years would lose their predictive ability.   There is change from year to 
year, but the trend is that the estimated beta coefficient is significant regardless of year.  
Also, some years the beta is not significant.  This can be partially explained by the small 
sample size.  For example, Model F estimates six parameters with only 12 or 13 
datapoints depending on the year.   Therefore, one would expect these estimates and there 
standard error to vary dramatically.   
Chapter Summary 
This chapter began by performing one-way analysis on each of the explanatory 
variables.  These results, combined with the results of previous studies covered in 
Chapter 2, led to the model building portion this research.  It was at this point in the 
process key differences between ANG and active duty fighter wings were identified.  The 
differences were severe enough to merit a separate model for each group of fighter wings. 
After a separate model was built for each group of fighter wings, this chapter 
analyzed the residuals to ensure that none of the standard regression assumptions were 
violated and to check for data points that were overly influential or extreme outliers.  
Then, the models were validated using the 2004 test set and the beta coefficients were 
updated.  Next, the excluded variables, such as ASD, percent deployed, and average age, 
were reinserted into the model to determine their significance while accounting for the 
effects of the main drivers.  It was at this time that Lag 1 CPFH became significant for 
the ANG model.  This variable was then included and the model was finalized.  
Additionally, this research noticed that Mt. Home AFB’s data points appeared to skew 
the results for the variable Average Age of Aircraft.  These data points were removed 
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along with one other overly influenced data point corresponding to Aviano AFB, 1999.  
The Average Aircraft Age variable was then included and the model was finalized.   
From there, this chapter compared the standardized beta coefficients to determine 
the relative influence of each explanatory variable.  Also, this chapter performed 
additional analysis on the year variable and identified an underlying trend that the 
explanatory variables in the model did not account for.  The source of this variation 
remains unknown, but more analysis on the explanatory variable, ASD, showed that 
major changes to ASD occurred at the same time as the underlying trend.  Following that 
analysis, this chapter analyzed the key assumption and found to be a reasonable one.  
Using the results presented in this chapter, this research next answers the ten investigative 




V.  Conclusion 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter integrates the results from Chapter 4 with the results of previous 
studies presented in Chapter 2 and answers the investigation questions presented in 
Chapter 1.  Following that, the “Year effect” is more thoroughly discussed and possible 
explanations are given for the similar trend seen in both the response and the residuals 
when plotted by year.   This chapter then summarizes its contribution to the literature and 
presents areas of future research. 
Investigation Questions Answered 
Does the CPFH of an F-16 fighter wing increase in a linearly fashion with 
increasing age of aircraft? 
From the data analyzed in this research, there is ample evidence to support the 
claim that the CPFH increases with the age of the aircraft for active duty fighter wings.  
There is no evidence to support this claim for ANG fighter wings.  The rate at which the 
average age of active duty aircraft results in higher CPFH is estimated by the beta 
coefficient that corresponds to that explanatory variable.  This research estimates that for 
every additional year of an F-16C/D fighter wing, the expected CPFH increase is $69.7 
(CY04$).  
Does the CPFH of F-16 fighter wing significantly change during contingencies? 
This research found no evidence to support the claim that the CPFH changes 
during contingencies.  It did find that utilization rate is a key driver and that percent 
deployed and utilization rate are roughly correlated.  As so far as this research is 
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concerned, the percent deployed is not a useful variable when predicting changes in the 
CPFH for F-16C/D.  The “Physic’s Based Model” discussed in Chapter 2 is a tool that 
can be used to predict O&M costs when the flying profile suddenly changes.  This model 
does not use the fact that an aircraft is or is not deployed, but rather it uses operational 
characteristics, such as time of the ground, number of sorties and landings, to predict 
O&M costs.  Therefore, the results of this variable are consistent with the literature 
review. 
Is the CPFH of an F-16 fighter wing dependent on the previous year’s CPFH? 
This research concludes that the CPFH for ANG fighter wings is linearly related 
to the previous year’s CPFH.  This is not the case for Active duty fighter wings.  The 
estimated slope for this explanatory variable is 0.166.  This is interpreted as rate at which 
the previous year’s CPFH is adding to the current year’s CPFH.  For example, if the 
previous year’s CPFH was 1000, then the current year’s CPFH would increase around 
166, or 16.6%.  In the opinion of this researcher, it is a significant amount. 
Does the Average Sortie Duration (ASD) of an F-16 fighter wing influence that 
wing’s CPFH? 
This research did not find any evidence to support the claim that ASD influences 
the CPFH of F-16C/Ds.  This conclusion is in agreement with six of the seven studies 
identified in Chapter 2 that analyzed this variable.  The one study that found ASD to be 
significant used transport aircraft, not fighters, in the analysis.  As far as fighter aircraft 
go, there has yet to be a study that supports this claim. 
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Does the utilization rate of an F-16 fighter wing influence that wing’s CPFH? 
There is a strong mathematical association between increased utilization and 
decreased CPFH.  The one-way analysis, the analysis when other variables are included, 
and every study covered in the literature review supports this claim.  The age old adage 
“the more you fly, the less you break” is supported by this research and by past research.  
Does the percent engine type of an F-16 fighter wing influence that wing’s CPFH  
Yes, but this explanatory variable is not nearly as predictive as the percent block.  
This may be due to the fact that there are five different types of engine in use, but this 
research had to combine two of the engines together due to data limitations.  
Furthermore, the block an aircraft has includes other technological differences, mainly 
different avionics.  The percent engine type variable is predictive, but the information 
contained in this variable is already captured in the percent block variable.  This can be 
seen in Table 16 where some of the VIF scores exceed 1,200.   
Do different F-16C/D blocks have a statistically significant influence on the 
CPFH? 
Yes, and this knowledge can be used to increase the predictive power of a model.  
In the opinion of this researcher, this variable is low hanging fruit because it has serious 
punch and it can be very accurately forecasted out.   
Does MajCOM influence the CPFH for F-16 fighter wings? 
The only MajCOM that significantly influences the CPFH is the ANG.  The 
differences between this MajCOM and the other MajCOMs are stunning.  Explanatory 
variables, such as percent block 30 and Lag 1 CPFH, are predictive for ANG fighter 
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wings and not predictive for active duty fighter wings.  Also, explanatory variables, such 
as percent block 50 and average aircraft age, are predictive for active duty fighter wings 
and not for ANG fighter wings.  This research also identified how the distribution of the 
CPFH is different for ANG fighter wings when compared to active duty fighter wings.  
This researcher believes these differences are caused by the ANG fighter wings utilizing 
older, less advanced F-16’s and flying them far less.   
Does base location influence the CPFH for F-16 fighter wings? 
This research believes there is ample evidence to support the claim that location 
of the base influences the CPFH.  Eielson AFB, Alaska, has a significantly lower CPFH 
then the rest of the bases and the ANG base in Ellington and the ACC base in Nellis had 
significantly higher CPFH the rest of the bases.  This researcher also notes that there were 
bases in hot climates that did not have a significantly higher CPFH.  They are: Luke AFB 
in Arizona, Cannon AFB in New Mexico, Kelly ANG in Texas, and Tucson ANG in 
Arizona.  Also, Atlantic City ANG in New Jersey had a significantly higher CPFH even 
though this location is not considered to have a hot climate. 
 This researcher also notes how much larger Nellis AFB’s CPFH is relative to the 
rest of the explanatory variables.  The beta coefficient corresponding to that dummy 
variable is estimated to be $1,685.  This is interpreted as the amount above the rest of the 
fighter wings in active duty fighter wings that Nellis AFB’s estimate needs to be adjusted 
even after taking into account all of the other explanatory variables.  Therefore, this 
researcher believes there is something else occurring at Nellis AFB besides the hot 
climate that is causing this extraordinarily high CPFH.  In the literature review, 
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Sherbrooke estimated that aircraft that fly demanding training sorties had three times as 
many removals per sortie as long cross-country sorties.  Sherbrooke’s research also 
observed that the demand rate for A-10’s at Nellis AFB was five times larger then other 
bases.  Since Nellis AFB is site of Red Flag and other training exercises, it is very 
plausible that the higher CPFH is driven by these differences in mission profile.  Also, 
the fighter wing at Nellis owns the Thunderbirds.  This, too, may contribute to Nellis 
AFB’s abnormally high CPFH.   
What is the relative influence of each of these factors? 
This empirical question is answered by comparing the standardized beta 
coefficients of each explanatory variables.  Figures 38 and 39 display these results for 
ANG fighter wings and active duty fighter wings, respectively.  In both groups of fighter 
wings, the percent block and utilization are both negative and carry roughly the same 
amount of influence on the response.  Similarly, the Lag 1 CPFH for ANG fighter wings 
and the Average Age of Aircraft for active duty fighter wings are both positive and also 
carry about the same amount of influence on the CPFH.   
The Year Effect 
This research noticed that the trend seen when the response is plotted by year, 
Figures 40 and 42, is very similar to the trend in the residuals of each of the final models, 
Figure 41 and 43.  Also of interest is the fact that the trend is definitely different between 
ANG fighter wings and Active duty fighter wings.  Additionally, the amount of variation 
due to the year effect is much greater for ANG fighter wings then for active duty fighter 
wings.  From these observations, this research makes three conclusions.  
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1) The explanatory variables in the model are not causing this year to year 
variation.  If they were, then there would not be the same trend between the 
responses and the residuals. 
2) The “Year Effect” is much more prominent among ANG fighter wings. 
3) Something occurred in 2001-2002 that dramatically changed the nature of the 
response.  This research did not identify the causal agent, but proposes two 
possible culprits, changes in mission profile following 9/11, and modifications 
to the F-16 fleet.   
a. The first possible culprit, changes in mission profile following the attacks 
on 9/11, is plausible because this research knows that changes in mission 
profile strongly affect the CPFH of F-16s.  After the attacks, our nation’s 
military transformed from a peacetime mission to a wartime mission.  
Additionally, this research identified one measure of mission profile, 
ASD, and observed two things.  First, the ASD for ANG fighter wings 
changed much more then the ASD for active duty fighter wings during this 
time period.  This research already concluded that the “Year Effect” is 
much more prominent among ANG fighter wings.  Secondly, this research 
observed that there were major changes in ASD in 2002 for ANG fighter 
wings.  In these fighter wings, the ASD suddenly increased while at the 
same time, the CPFH suddenly decreased.  The active duty fighter wing’s 
ASD stayed mostly stagnant at this time. What makes this explanation 
unappealing to this researcher is that the ASD is statistically significant.  If 
changes in mission profile were the culprit, then the statistics would 
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support it.  The p-values are not even close to being significant (p-value of 
0.129 for active duty fighter wings and 0.46 for ANG fighter wings).  
Considering that each data point is a wing’s annual expenditures and that 
this research analyzes 40 of 44 Air Force active duty FWs from 1998 to 
2004, the analysis would have detected a difference if one were present. 
b. The second possible culprit is modifications to the F-16 fleet.  This 
explanation is attractive because this research quantified how percent 
engine type and percent block influence the CPFH of the F-16.  Knowing 
that these programmatic variables are significant and understanding that 
the Air Force is constantly performing Time Change Technical Orders on 
aircraft, it very plausible that this variable is the culprit.  In the literature 
review, Raymond Pyles of the RAND Corp. noted that there were not any 
studies on the effect of modifications on material consumption cost.  The 
fact there has been so little research on this topic leads this researcher to 
include it as a possible culprit. 
Significance of Research 
This research accomplished three goals: it identified and quantified variables that 
influence the CPFH of F-16, it built a model to predict the CPFH for F-16, and it 
identified the presence of a lurking variable, titled the “Year Effect”.  First, it identified 
and quantified variables that influence CPFH.  The variables that most influence the 
CPFH of the F-16 are: ANG/Active duty, Percent Block, Utilization Rate, Base, Lag 1 
CPFH (for ANG fighter wings) and Average Aircraft Age (for active duty fighter wings).   
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Secondly, this research built a predictive model for both ANG and active duty fighter 
wings.  These models were then used to determine the relative contribution of each 
explanatory variable.  Finally, this research identified a lurking variable that the 
explanatory variables investigated did not account for.  Two possible explanations were 
given: changes in mission profile following the 9/11 attacks and modifications to the F-
16 fleet. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
This research recommends three important areas of future research. 
1) Further identification of explanatory variables to include more emphasis on 
economic, mission profile, and modification variables.  Eventually, these lead 
to identifying what is causing the “Year Effect”.  Although this research did 
contribute to our current understanding between CPFH and operational 
variables, it did not fully exhaust all of the operational variables.  
Additionally, this research did not consider economic variables that also may 
significantly influence the CPFH. 
2) Further investigation to explain why Mt. Home AFB behaved so differently.  
This entire base was removed from analysis because it overly influenced the 
analysis.  The reason why this occurred is unclear.  Two possible explanations 
exist.  First, this research may have received erroneous data from the two 
sources or this research may have accidentally corrupted the database creation 
process.  Since human interaction is heavily involved in every step, this 
explanation seems plausible.   Secondly, this data from Mt. Home AFB could 
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be accurate.  In this case, this research would have less justification to remove 
it, but removing it may still be acceptable.  The purpose of building a model is 
to predict the average response.  Since Mt. Home AFB data was so atypical, 
this research would not want to model this atypical response.  Furthermore, in 
this case, a separate methodology may have to be generated to predict the 
CPFH of that base.   
3) Determine if using CPFH factors is the best way to budget for O&M 
expenditures.  The current process of using of factors to develop budgets 
presumes that hours flown is directly proportional to costs.  This assumption 
is testable.  Two important research questions for this topic include: 
a. Are there any fixed costs associated with DLRs? 
b. Is a wing’s annual DLR expenditure a function of number of hours flown?  
In other words, is this relationship best described as linear, quadratic, 
exponential, etc? 
Thesis Summary 
 This thesis investigated the predictive capability of nine operational and 
programmatic variables on the CPFH for F-16C/Ds by examining data from 40 Air Force 
fighter wings from 1998 to 2004.  This research contributed new information regarding 
the influence of the explanatory variables:  percent block, percent engine type, percent 
deployed, and lag 1 CPFH.  Furthermore, this research re-affirmed the influence of 
known explanatory variables such as base, utilization rate, and ASD.  Unlike past 
research, this research quantified the relative influence of each of these explanatory 
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variables.  Also noteworthy, this research identified an underlying trend and determined 
which variables were not causing the variation as well proposing two possible causes.  In 
closing, this research presents two models to predict the CPFH for F-16 fighter wings and 





Appendix A:  Change in Maintenance Write-Ups per Mission Code for the Fire 






Writed-Ups (Obs - Exp)^2
Chi-Square 
Statistic
ADIX 244 157.03 7563.78 48.17
ACTX 87 32.66 2952.84 90.41
AGXX 976 1011.23 1241.15 1.23
DACT 152 91.09 3710.03 40.73
FCFX 53 57.99 24.90 0.43
LCLX 68 118.11 2511.01 21.26
NPXC 71 93.78 518.93 5.53
PROF 71 77.94 48.16 0.62
MISC 78 163.67 7339.35 44.84
RNAG 41 36.06 24.40 0.68
RGAT 35 39.6 21.16 0.53
NAGX 77 78.51 2.28 0.03
ACMX 76 66.06 98.80 1.50
A119 30 35.92 35.05 0.98









01CA COMBAT, CREDIT   AMC = COMBAT MSN NORTHERN WATCH
01CG COMBAT
01DW COMBAT SORTIES(ACC FIGHTER/BOMBER) ENDURING FREEDOM
01EW COMBAT SORTIES(ACC AIR REFUELING) ENDURING FREEDOM
01FW COMBAT SORTIES ENDURING FREEDOM (ALL OTHERS)
01GD COMBAT SUPPORT
01GG COMBAT
020N ONW COMBAT SUPPORT (Operation Northern Watch)
020R 970 COMBAT SUPPORT
020S OSW COMBAT SUPPORT (Operation Southern Watch)
02AD DENY FLIGHT OVERWATER MISSION (ETTF)
02AG COMBAT SUPPORT - SPT OF FRIENDLY FORCES IN ARMED CONF.
02CA AMC = COMBAT SUPPORT MSN NORTHERN WATCH
02DF DELIB GUARD/PHONE DUKE ANG CBT SPT REF/DUAL
02DG DELIB GUARD/PHONE DUKE ANG CBT SPT AIRLIFT
02DW COMBAT SUPPORT SORTIES OEF ACC FIGHTER/BOMBERS (Operation Enduring Freedom)
02EK ONW SORTIES (Operation Northern Watch)
02EW COMBAT SUPPORT SORTIES OEF ACC AIR REFUELING/SURV
02FW COMBAT SUPPORT SORTIES OEF ALL OTHERS
02MR ONW RESERVE OPS
02NL COMBAT SUPPORT SW SORTIE--ACC (Southwest Asia)







A5ND DEPLOY TO OPERATION LOCATION
A5NR REDEPLOY FROM OPERATION LOCATION
A5NU USAFE REFUELING/AIRLIFT DEPLOY/REDEPLY
A5NV USAFE TANKER REFUELING/DUAL ROLE
A76A PROVIDE COMFORT SORTIE
A78A SPECIAL MISSION
A78S DESERT SHIELD
A79A KC135 RIYADH SORTIES
A79B DESERT STORM
A79G KC135 RIYADH SORTIES
A79K OPERATIONAL MISSION
A79R DESERT SHIELD RECON SUP
A7BN DEPLOYMENT/REDEPLOYMENT SORTIE
A7DA KC135 RIYADH DEPLOYMENT AND ACC DEPLOYER/REDEPLOYER 03
A7DF ACC--DELIBERATE FORGE (BOSNIA/BALKINS)
A7DG KC135 RIYADH DEPLOYMENT (GUARD)
A7DS AFSOC -- OEF
A7GA DESERT TIME
A7GW DESERT SHIELD FLYING TIME
A7RA KC135 RIYADH REDEPLOYMENT (ACTIVE)
A7RG KC135 RIYADH RE-DEPLOYMENT (GUARD)
A7RR KC135 RIYADH REDEPLOYMENT (RESERVE)
A7YA SW ASIA / DESERT HOURS






A8CU CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS/USAFE AIRLIFT
A8DA 970HHQ CONTINGENCY
c2cg NORTHERN WATCH
N8CA PROVIDE COMFORT 90/91/92/93/94/95 (KURDISTAN)




O10L COMBAT - SWA
O10M COMBAT - ONW
O10N COMBAT - OJG (Operation Joint Guardian)
O10Z 01 & 02 MSG R021922Z JAN 96--BOSNIA/HERTZAGOVINA
O11A COMBAT, CREDIT   HOSTILE ACTIVITY
O11D COMBAT
O1A0 COMBAT TIME
O1AA COMBAT, CREDIT   HOSTILE ACTIVITY
O1AD DENY FLIGHT OVERLAND MISSION (ETTF)
O1AF COMBAT
O1AG COMBAT MISSION (DIRECT HOSTILE FIRE)
O1AJ COMBAT, CREDIT   HOSTILE ACTIVITY
O1AK OP JOINT GUARDIAN -COMBAT ZONE
O1AL COMBAT, CREDIT  SWA
O1AM COMBAT (ETTF)





O1BG PROVIDE COMFORT II (PCII)
O1BK COMBAT OPS RECON ODF
O1BL SWA COMBAT SORTIE (Operation Southwest Asia)
O1BW DESERT TIME
o1cf NOTHERN WATCH - ANG COMBAT MISSION (REFUEL/ DUAL ROLE)
O1DK OEF COMBAT SORTIE
O1DW OEF COMBAT MISSION ANG JSTARS (03)
o1ef ENDURING FREEDOM (CBT SPT) - ANG TANKER TWCF MISSION
O1EU COMBAT ENDURING FREEDOM RC135U
O1GA COMBAT OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH
O1GD COMBAT SUPPORT
O1GG COMBAT
O1HA COMBAT ONW NO FLY OPERATIONS
O1IG JOINT GAURDIAN/JOINT FORGE
O1JB JOINT FORGE - AMC COMBAT MISSION (REFUEL/ DUAL ROLE)
O1LA COMBAT
O1LR COMBAT SWA (RC135)
O1NL SWA COMBAT SORTIE
O1OA DESERT STORM




O1SF ANG-PID103ID OPNS-TNKR TWCF,FTR,AFSOC,RESQ,JSTARS COMB
O1VA COMBAT
O1WD COMBAT SORTIES(ACC FIGHTER/BOMBER) ENDURING FREEDOM
O1XM COMBAT (100 ARF)
O1ZF COMBAT MISSION DESERT SHIELD
O1ZG COMBAT MISSION DESERT SHIELD
O1ZH COMBAT MISSION DESERT SHIELD






P1QG PROVIDE PROMISE - AIR NATIONAL GUARD ONLY
P1TR AFR UE JOINT FORGE - DEP - USAFE FUNDED
P1UR AFR UE JOINT FORGE - EMP - USAFE FUNDED
P1VR AFR UE JOINT FORGE - REDEP - USAFE FUNDED
P20A AFSOC--NOBLE EAGLE
P2AS OPERATION NOBLE EAGLE
P2BD NOBLE EAGLE MSCA SPT NY - AFR ASSOC DEPLOYMENT MISSION
P2BF NOBLE EAGLE MSCA SPT NY - AFR ASSOC REDEPLOYMENT MSN
P2BX PACOM--AFR--NOBLE EAGLE ASSOC ALFT TWCF MSN   CA
P2D0 OPERATION NOBLE EAGLE (FIGHTERS)
P2DO OPERATION NOBLE EAGLE
P2EO NOBLE EAGLE --ACC
P2ER OPERATION NOBLE EAGLE (RESERVES)
P2JA OPERATION NOBLE EAGLE
P2KA OPERATION NOBLE EAGLE
P2KZ OPERATION NOBLE EAGLE
P2PA RESTORE HOPE
P3IC NORTHERN WATCH DEPLOY/REDEPLOY
P3QA PROVIDE COMFORT
P3TR AFR UE - NORTHERN WATCH DEP - USAFE FUNDED
P3UR AFR UE - NORTHERN WATCH EMP - USAFE FUNDED
P3VR AFR UE - NORTHERN WATCH REDEP - USAFE FUNDED
P4DA OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH (DESERT STORM)
P4DK OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH (DESERT STORM)
P4EA OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH (DESERT STORM)
P4EK OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH (DESERT STORM)
P4FA OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH (DESERT STORM)
P4GA OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH/AVIANO AB OR RAF LAKENHEATH
P4GN OP NORTHERN WATCH - TRAINING FLIGHTS





P5GD OPERATION DENY FLIGHT (USAFE)
P5GP DENY FLIGHT (PISA)
P5IA OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE/LAKENHEATH
P5ID OPERATION DENY FLIGHT
P5QG DELIBERATE GUARD/DECISIVE GUARD (PISA)
P7AL ENDURING FREEDOM (SWA) SORTIES
P7AM ENDURING FREEDOM (ONW) SORTIES
P7D0 OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (FIGHTERS/BOMBERS)
P7DA ENDURING FREEDOM FIGHTER/BOMBERS
P7DO "OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM"
P7EC "OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM" (552 WING)
P7F0 OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (ALL OTHERS)
P7FA ENDURING FREEDOM ALL OTHERS SORTIE
P7JA ENDURING FREEDOM
P7JC USAFE FIGHTER OPS -- OEF (OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM)
P7JT USAFE--OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (TNG SORTIES)
P7JZ ENDURING FREEDOM
P7KA OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM
P7KJ OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM
p8aa OEF I--ACTIVE TANKER MSN(P&M)
P8DC ACC--OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) FIGHTER/BOMBER
P8DO ACC--OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF)--FTR/BOMBER
P8DS ACC--OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM(OIF) FIGHTER/BOMBER
P8FC ACC--OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM(OIF)ALL OTHER AIRCRAFT
P8FO ACC--OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM(OIF)--ALL OTHER AIRCRAFT




P8JC USAFE FIGHTER OPERATIONS--OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM(OIF)
P8JE AFE--OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM IRAQ (OEF-I)
P8JR AFE--OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF)







P9GE DELIBERATE GAURD DEPLOY/REDEPLOY/NONOPERATIONAL SORTIE
P9IB USAFE--JOINT GUARDIAN (BOSNIA)
P9IK USAFE--OPERATION JOINT GUARDIAN (KOSOVO)
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Appendix C:  MajCOM-MDS Specific Conversion Factors for DLRs  
Year MAJCOM 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
1998 ACC 1.1323 1.2799 1.2114 1.4016 1.5385 1.7789
1998 AETC 1.3404 1.2013 1.4061 1.7125 1.8021 1.9299
1998 ANG 1.2060 1.2475 1.3022 1.5457 1.7010 1.8370
1998 PACAF 1.2337 1.3650 1.3657 1.5244 1.6514 2.0141
1998 USAFE 1.1371 1.3667 1.2876 1.4353 1.5977 1.8721
1999 ACC 0.0000 1.1527 1.1550 1.2630 1.3602 1.5935
1999 AETC 0.0000 0.9727 1.1739 1.3403 1.3804 1.5425
1999 ANG 0.0000 1.0028 1.1247 1.2976 1.3745 1.5095
1999 PACAF 0.0000 1.1211 1.1772 1.2715 1.3785 1.6788
1999 USAFE 0.0000 1.2258 1.2315 1.3584 1.5076 1.7109
2000 ACC 0.0000 0.0000 0.9954 1.0877 1.1969 1.3515
2000 AETC 0.0000 0.0000 1.0173 1.0815 1.3914 1.4790
2000 ANG 0.0000 0.0000 1.0406 1.2014 1.3917 1.4092
2000 PACAF 0.0000 0.0000 1.0531 1.1265 1.2490 1.4559
2000 USAFE 0.0000 0.0000 1.0081 1.1066 1.3038 1.4269
2001 ACC 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.1022 1.1769 1.3362
2001 AETC 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.1573 1.1909 1.3114
2001 ANG 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.1565 1.2611 1.3401
2001 PACAF 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0963 1.1996 1.4437
2001 USAFE 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.1062 1.2521 1.4041
2002 ACC 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0364 1.1796
2002 AETC 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0328 1.1458
2002 ANG 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0350 1.1587
2002 PACAF 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0231 1.2640
2002 USAFE 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0610 1.2189
2003 ACC 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.1915
2003 AETC 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0655
2003 ANG 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.1229
2003 PACAF 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.2051
2003 USAFE 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.1470  
 
Appendix D:  Estimated Percent Block for ANG and Active Duty FWs from 1998 to 
2004 
ANG Active Duty
Block 25 24.7% 4.1%
Block 30 52.0% 10.6%
Block 32 2.4% 2.9%
Block 40 2.0% 42.3%
Block 42 14.6% 7.1%
Block 50 0.0% 25.1%
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